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Prime Minister and former KLA leader, Hashim Thaci, is attending an 
important meeting in Brussels, where he is told about broad dissatis-
faction with Kosovo’s progress within areas of vital importance to 
the European Union. 
In order to pressure the Prime Minister into achieving results, 
ICR/EUSR, Pieter Feith tells Hashim: “Remember, I can get you re-
moved in 24 hours”. To which Hashim replies: “I don’t need 24 hours 
to get you removed”. 
Urban legend among diplomats in Pristina. 
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Abstract 
This bachelor report is investigating the collaboration between Kosovo and 
the international presence in the country.  It answers how the people of Ko-
sovo have followed a Script of Sovereignty, where the Ahtisaari Plan is a cen-
tral part, in an attempt to gain international recognition for their declaration 
of independence in 2008. To investigate this situation have the study used 
the theoretical framework of Stephen Krasner’s theory about the Aspects of 
Sovereignty, 
The investigation has focused on how the local collaboration with the EU in-
stitutions in Kosovo works and how this relationship affects Kosovo’s sover-
eignty. The aim is to bring together the sovereignty script and the collabora-
tion with the international institutions to show how they have defined the 
sovereignty process of Kosovo.  
The study concludes that the Ahtisaari Plan have been essential for the de-
velopment in Kosovo and on their attempt to achieve international recogni-
tion. It also shows that the current limited recognition causes problems for 
the EU institution’s mandates, giving the Kosovars an opportunity to act 
more autonomous.  
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Preface 
The modern history of Kosovo has, during the last ten years or so, received a 
lot of attention from both international media and academia. Starting with 
yet another ethnic conflict in the Balkans with Serbian participation, the 
1998 unrest between Albanians and Serbs started a chain of reactions: From 
the NATO-campaign a year later, over UN administration, and finally to the 
declaration of independence in 2008. And even though media interest is de-
clining, giving no new outbreaks of violence, the conflict is nowhere near a 
solution.  
There is still tension between the Serbian minority and the Albanian majority 
in today’s Kosovo. The country’s geographical position in between Western 
and Russian spheres of influences is part of diplomatic tension between the 
European Union (EU) and Russia. And the fact that many members of the UN, 
and even some EU-countries, have their own rebellious fractions struggling 
for independence has made it impossible for the Kosovar state to be fully 
recognised internationally.  
There are consequently still many questions available for interesting aca-
demic scrutiny. This study has had its breading ground in the fact that Koso-
vo, and the international commotion surrounding it, was worth a closer look. 
In the current situation the EU’s influence on Kosovo seems massive. And if 
the EU indeed is the Promised Land for Kosovo, whether it is financial, cul-
tural, social or political, the Kosovar policies towards the EU must be charac-
terised by EU’s interests and engagement in Kosovo. This kind of sovereignty 
trade-offs is not unfamiliar to other countries, even though it might not be 
this extreme. Both parts of the Danish population and the Danish politicians 
have big concerns about Denmark giving its sovereignty to the European 
Community. This idea is a very typical, yet very nationalistic, way of perceiv-
ing sovereignty. A light version of the hyper-nationalism that some parts of 
the international society claimed played a major part in the Balkan War in 
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1994-5 (Gheciu, 2006). This study will also examine if this comprehension of 
sovereignty is to narrow, and how the idea of sovereignty can be interpreted 
in various ways. 
This study has not only given us a greater understanding of the mechanisms 
of sovereignty. It has also giving insight to some of the challenges of nation 
building, when the developers comes from outside the state or the nation, as 
the case is when UN and EU are the main contributors to the building pro-
cess. Our research trip to Kosovo has added an extra dimension to this, as we 
have been able to experience some of these challenges first hand, and on a 
very personal level, by interviewing the individuals implementing this pro-
cess of state- and national building in Kosovo. 
So it is our hope that this study will contribute to the field, by not only clarify 
the sovereignty’s impact on a state like Kosovo, but also give insight to how 
sovereignty impacts the nation building process. This understanding will re-
sult in a policy recommendation on how to give more local ownership to the 
Kosovars in a process where the international society builds a state on behalf 
of a nation struggling for sovereignty. 
But in order for the study to arrive at its starting point of Kosovo’s struggle 
for sovereignty, it is necessary to back up a bit and broaden the view of the 
research field.   
 
The Research Field 
To understand the exchange of sovereignty between Kosovo and the EU, it is 
necessary to understand the fight for independence, a sovereign state of Ko-
sovo and the history behind it. Though it is not this study’s goal to present a 
fully understanding of Kosovo’s past (for this see Judah, 2008), it is a necessi-
ty to at least scratch the surface in order to get a greater understanding of the 
current situation in Kosovo. 
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Much has been written about ‘who were there first?’ and which nation tradi-
tionally, historically and politically deserves to have supremacy over the ter-
ritory of what is now the partially recognised state of Kosovo. These argu-
mentations have nevertheless no specific implications for this study, as it 
concentrates on the existing state of Kosovo, its policies and relations with 
the EU. For the same reason this overview goes no further back than to the 
time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in which the current ter-
ritorial province of Kosovo had its first political fights for independence and 
autonomy.  
Kosovo had in 1966 been promoted from ‘region’ to ‘autonomous province’, 
within the Yugoslav Federation. This was far from being given equal status 
with the ‘republics’ in the Federation. Only peoples classed as ‘nations’ could 
get the political entity of a republic; peoples classed as ‘nationalities’, like the 
Albanians, already had a motherland outside Yugoslavia and could therefore 
not be considered for their own republic. All the same Kosovo gained even 
more independence in 1974 through its own parliament, national bank, po-
lice and members of the federal parliament, as well as in the Serbian parlia-
ment. Despite all this Kosovo remained an official part of Serbia. (Judah, 
2008:53-4 & 57) 
When Slobodan Milosevic propelled Yugoslavia into civil war his first move 
was the revoking of Kosovo’s autonomous rights. By surrounding Kosovo’s 
assembly with police and tanks in March 1989 forced he the assembly to vote 
in favour of constitutional amendments that restored Serbia’s power over 
Kosovo. With this move, he had secured the support of four out of eight prov-
inces, thus only needing one more to vote him supreme ruler of Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic never got his last vote, Croatia opposed most strongly, but also Slo-
venia and Bosnia had had enough of Milosevic’s aggressiveness and headed 
for the exit, eventually resulting in the Balkan Wars of the 90’s. (Judah, 
2008:67) 
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These ups and downs in the degree of Kosovar autonomy could have provid-
ed massive incentives for the Kosovars to become fully independent from 
Serbia the way they did. Speculating, the abrupt way Serbia suddenly and 
forcefully revoked Kosovo’s self-government could well have increased the 
reluctance about the Serbian supremacy, and in this way prevented a slower 
and more peacefully path, first towards Kosovar extended self-government 
and then independence. 
As the Balkan Wars started in 1992, Kosovo held its first presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Deemed illegal by the Serbs, these where held in 
private houses, resulting in the election of Ibrahim Rugova as president. Ru-
gova’s new Kosovo would not be able to defend its citizens against the supe-
rior Serbian military, and with no way of arming the Kosovars, he was forced 
to a policy of peaceful resistances. (Judah, 2008:70-1) This seems to have 
earned Kosovo its first Western support, in form of a warning from US Presi-
dent George Bush, in December 1992, stating that: “In the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serbian actions, the U.S. will be prepared to employ mili-
tary force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbian proper” (Gellman, 1999).  
This threat shows the first Western interest in Kosovo after the fall of Com-
munism, as well as an interest in keeping some of the peace left in the Bal-
kans during the 1990’s. Throughout the civil war in Bosnia, Kosovo remained 
relative peaceful, but under massive Serb influence. This lasted till 1996-7 
when Kosovo’s Liberation Army (KLA), with as little as 150 men, stated to 
attack Serbian police and Albanian collaborators. The KLA first grew and 
then got almost destroyed by the Serbian army before the threat of NATO 
interference seized the fighting, where the organisation was able to reorgan-
ise under the peace talks. Despite pressure from both the West and Russia 
fighting blew up again in the beginning of 1999. (Judah, 2008:78-84) 
Peace talks were initiated again in February 1999, under the name the Ram-
bouillet Accords. These talks ended in Milosevic rejecting the final compro-
mise in which Kosovo gained considerable autonomy, but remained linked to 
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Serbia, giving the West no choice but to intervene by force. (MacShane, 2011) 
Some observers points to guilt over the Srebrenica massacre when explaining 
why Western leaders was so quick to react when yet another round of Balkan 
fighting could not be stopped at the negotiation tables. 2,000 had already 
died in the conflict between KLA and the Serbs, and UNHCR reported of more 
than 200,000 internally displaced refugees in Kosovo. The 78 day NATO 
bombing campaign and the Serbian army on the ground forced the displace-
ment of another 1.25 million Kosovo Albanians, and even though the conflict 
saw its share of ethnic cleansing a new Srebrenica was avoided. (Judah, 
2008:84-9) 
No matter the cause, Slobodan Milosevic effectively lost his grip on Kosovo 
after intense negotiations between the USA, the EU and Russia, as UN Resolu-
tion 1244 was ratified. The resolution called for the withdrawal of all Serbian 
troops, disarmament of KLA and the present of relevant international organi-
sations to establish an international security presence in Kosovo (UN, 1999: 
2-3). In reality, this meant that NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), backed by an 
UN mission of interim administration (UNMIK), seized control over Kosovo 
from June 12 1999, and stated to rebuilt the province (Judah, 2008:91). This 
move did not give Kosovo any kind of self-determination, but it is important 
as it removed Serbia’s grip on the province, effectively opening for later co-
operation with the EU and later still, Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
Furthermore the resolution did outline the territorial entity of Kosovo in a 
way that included the municipals with large Serbian majorities in now 
Northern Kosovo, a decision still causing trouble for both the international 
presence and Kosovo. (EU Diplomat, 2011 & UN, 1999) 
The international missions in Kosovo worked more with the ‘standards’ of 
Kosovo, rather than with its ‘status’. Under the term ‘standards’ was eight 
fields with 109 goals for various European standards, from human rights 
over democratic institutions to the rule of law, Kosovo had to fulfil. The 
standards over status premise changed after ethnic violence broke out in 
 
16 
2004 in which 19 people was killed, more than 900 wounded and 4,366 peo-
ple was forced to flee. (Judah, 2008:109-110) The UN had to re-evaluate its 
effort in Kosovo, an assignment given to former Finnish president, Martti 
Ahtisaari, who had already been part of the peace talks prior to the NATO 
bombings of 1999. More than a year of negotiations between the Kosovar and 
Serbian leaderships went nowhere. Realising that none of the participators 
would cave, Ahtisaari and his team developed their own plan for the future of 
Kosovo, parallel with the talks. The recommendation, of what has come to be 
known as ‘The Ahtisaari Plan’, was that “Kosovo status should be independ-
ence, supervised [initially] by the international community” (Ahtisaari, 
2004:2). Russia, of cause, vetoed the implementation of the report, but its 
recommendation would none the less become an important part of Kosovo, 
after the state’s declaration of independence. (Judah, 2008:111-3)  
On the 17th of February 2008 Kosovo’s assembly declared Kosovo an inde-
pendent country. No less than eight times are the Ahtisaari Plan mentioned 
on the declaration (Kosovo, 2008a). Kosovo quickly gained a lot of friends 
among Western states, and only 11 days after the declaration of independ-
ence entered a number of recognising countries from the West Kosovo in 
form of an International Civilian Office (ICO, 2008).  
According to the Ahtisaari Plan two international institutions should enter 
Kosovo as the country declared its independence in February 2008. The first 
was the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, called EULEX. The 
EULEX mission includes monitoring, mentor and advising Kosovar law insti-
tutions, as well as executive powers to investigate serious crimes such as ter-
rorism, organised-, interethnic- and war crimes. (EU, 2008:2) The other insti-
tution was the International Civilian Office (ICO), consisting of the 21 EU 
countries recognises Kosovo1 (except Malta), Norway, Switzerland, Turkey 
                                                        
1
 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain do not recognise Kosovo. 
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and the United States (ICO; 2011a). Heading ICO is the International Civilian 
Representative (ICR) who was double-hatted as the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR). This position had a very strong corrective mandate 
and according to the Ahtisaari Plan would the ICR/EUSR:  
(…) have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall 
have strong corrective powers to ensure implementation of the 
settlement [the Ahtisaari Plan]. Among his/her powers is the abil-
ity to annul decisions or laws adopted by the Kosovo authorities 
and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she de-
termines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. (Ahtisaari, 
2007:8) 
The plan was, as mentioned, never endorsed by the Security Council, so what 
made the Kosovo authorities agree to the establishment of an ICR/EUSR and 
EULEX? The deal between Kosovo and the EU have been outlined as follows: 
in order for the Kosovo authorities to get recognition, support and money 
from the US and a bulk of the EU countries, they had to accept the main pro-
visions of the plan as well as inviting the two international missions with a 
mandate according to the plan. (Judah, 2008:115) Again is it impossible to 
deny that Kosovar desperation for a sovereign state have played a large role 
in explaining why they have agreed to partial recognition. 
As of May 2011 have the ICR and EUSR position been split up into two man-
dates, where the ICR has kept the corrective mandate (EU, 2011a). Besides 
the EUSR and the EULEX, has the EU an European Commission Liaisons Office 
(ECLO) in Kosovo providing “significant project funding to strengthen institu-
tions, develop the economy and realise European standards, [and] supports 
the Stabilisation and Association process” (ENLUX, 2011). So it seems to be a 
beneficial EU institution for Kosovo, but giving up one’s sovereignty in order 
to gain this and EU recognition seems an exceptional large trade-off.  
These three institutions, together with KFOR and ICO, contribute to a massive 
Western influence in Kosovo, not only in the legal and political system, but in 
everyday life for every Kosovar. KFOR soldiers still patrol the streets at cer-
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tain sites and cities. EULEX train large amounts of police officers, judges and 
prosecutors and can have their own staff leading a Kosovar trial. On paper 
the EUSR, ICO and the ECLO have the ability to control most, if not every, as-
pect of Kosovo’s decision making and trade, as well as being the major con-
tributor to the rebuilding of Kosovo.  
With the Western Balkans being a virtually inner courtyard, of the new, ex-
panded European Union (see Picture 1.1), seems the EU present in the Bal-
kans obvious. The Kosovars dreaming of creating a fully independent state, 
however, can’t be pleased with the fact that foreign governments and inter-
national institutions have such a firm grip in their autonomy. They might ac-
cept this for now, but it does not lessen the dilemma for both the EU and Ko-
sovo. The current situation is problematic because of the unorthodox charac-
ter of Kosovo’s sovereignty and the extent to which the sovereignty has been 
compromised by the EU in an effort, ironically, to create a conventional Koso-
var state. 
In order for this study to conclude which interest, conflicting or mutual, ef-
fecting Kosovo’s sovereignty, it is necessary to cut a lot of possible research 
subjects out of the research field. As mentioned earlier, this study is con-
Picture 1.1 (Judah, 2008:129) 
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cerned about the dilemma posed by the EU’s effects on Kosovo’s sovereignty. 
The conflict between Serbs and Albanians, especially in Northern Kosovo, 
will therefore not be scrutinised. Neither will the relationships between Rus-
sia, the EU or Serbia, even though these relationships have had enormous 
influence on both Kosovo’s independence and limited recognition. A more 
comprehensive outline of the study’s scope will follow after the research 
question. 
The research field of this study limits itself to the object of understanding 
how this sovereignty dilemma can be understood accordingly with the inter-
ests of both the Kosovar government and the EU. In order to get the full un-
derstanding of this, the study must clarify the motives behind the massive 
Western/EU presence in Kosovo, it must be able to show EU’s expectations to 
the Kosovar leadership, and to comprehend to what extend the Kosovars im-
plement policies in order to meet these expectations and in continuation 
hereof avoiding the corrective powers of the ICR, the executive powers of 
EULEX and the financial powers of the ECLO.  
 
Research Thesis 
The analysis will focus on how Kosovo did act towards their declaration of 
interdependence and the following process of their aim to achieve interna-
tional recognition as a sovereign state in terms of following the Ahtisaari Plan 
in their sovereignty script. There will follow an analysis on the EU institu-
tions and the relationship and collaboration with the local government, and 
how this affects Kosovo’s sovereignty.  
The last part of the analysis will focus on how the sovereignty script of Koso-
vo have defined the collaboration with the EU to show how the sovereignty 
script have caused the effects the international presence has on Kosovo’s 
sovereignty. 
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Research Question 
How does the EU presence affect Kosovo’s sovereignty, and which arrange-
ments are the Kosovar government taking to meet the EU? 
 
Scope of the Study 
To be more specific about what the research question is going to answer, this 
section of the study will go through its scope to explain how some of the as-
pects related to the research question have been disregarded in the study. 
These might be mentioned in the research field, but not all of these aspects 
are important for a comprehensive and complex answer. Other aspects have 
been necessary to disregard because of limited time, while some are going to 
be withdrawn from the analysis, to be picked up again in the discussion. The-
se aspects are so extensive and have a big influence on the process of the de-
velopment in Kosovo that it is impossible not to comment on them.  
The study is focusing on the parts of UN Resolution 1244 that have an effect 
on the sovereignty changes and the sovereignty Kosovo has already. The res-
olution, however, is the reason for the military presence in Kosovo today. The 
resolution opened in 1999 for international police and military, and this part 
of the international presence is mainly left out of the study. Not because it is 
not relevant. Not having any military capacities, depending on others’ is a 
major lack of sovereignty. But this situation is not new, and this study’s focus 
is on the EU institutions in Kosovo, therefore has it been chosen not to in-
clude the police and military context of Kosovo.  
UNMIK is as KFOR still working in Kosovo under the mandate of Resolution 
1244. Many of its duties are moved to the ICO and the EU institutions. UNMIK 
is hence not going to be involved in the study. Where UNMIK is still an im-
portant actor is in the northern parts of Kosovo, and the institution is a key 
factor in keeping the rebellious region’s basic necessities running.  
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The northern conflict between ethnic Serbs and the Albanian government 
could very well have influence on Kosovo’s sovereignty, due to the lack of 
government control in the area. The conflict itself, however, will not be part 
of the analysis. That the conflict is between ethnic groups does not have a 
decisive interest for the question of the sovereignty aspects between the Ko-
sovars and the EU. The conflict will in some extent be used in the study, but 
only in a small amount, to determine some key points to help answering the 
research question, points which are a matter of there being a conflict, not 
about who is fighting in it.  
It should be noted that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) also have a mandate to operate in Kosovo. In impact of this or-
ganisation compared to the others in this analysis have been deemed rather 
unimportant and does not change the overall picture of the general interna-
tional presence in Kosovo. The study have therefore value its time better off 
by sticking to researching the larger institution.  
The institution with the most extensive mandate, ICO have neither put a big 
mark on this study. Even though the institution have corrective powers over 
the Kosovar government, have they never used them, and this study found 
frictions between those two actors little (ICO, 2011b). This is not to say that 
the institution does not impact the sovereignty of Kosovo, just that this study 
has found the relations with more friction a lot more interesting. Time and 
effort have therefore been with the EU institutions where the five non-
recognisers have played a big role on both the mandates of the institutions 
and in showing how Kosovo’s limited international recognition has affected 
the country. 
Even though the EU included non-recognisers the Union does not have lesser 
interest in the area. Stability problems such as trafficking and other kinds of 
trans-border crimes definitely have effects on the collaboration with the in-
ternational society, but is also a problem internally in Kosovo. There is no 
doubt that this does have an effect on the sovereignty of Kosovo, but in this 
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study is it mainly a reason for EU interest, and thus an explanation of why EU 
is present and affects Kosovo’s sovereignty in the first place.  
In the same way that stability is an EU interest are economics a big reason for 
Kosovo’s desire to approach the EU. ‘The economics of Kosovo’ would be a 
study in itself, and this study have therefore been compelled not to spent the 
time not available on diving deeper into the economic effects on Kosovo’s 
sovereignty, others than as an explanation for Kosovo’s EU interest.  
Finally, the study is bound by the time frame that means no further empirical 
data have been obtained after December 1st. Eventual developments after this 
date, concerning the study’s research field has thus not been included. 
 
Report Structure 
The figure on the next page shows the study’s different chapters and a short 
summarising of their contents. The arrows illustrate how some chapters in-
fluence the substance of others. 
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Introduction 
Research Field 
Conclusion 
Theory 
Four aspects of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty Script 
Page 1 
Policy Recommendation  
Discussion 
Methodology 
Understanding, Interviews 
and Field Research 
Analysis 
Sovereignty Trade-Offs and 
Consequences of the Script 
Discussion 
Other Influential Factors 
Research Question 
Figure 1.1: Report Structure 
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Analysis Design 
  
Figure 1.2: Analysis Design 
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Chapter 2 
Methodological Considerations 
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The following chapter presents the study’s methodological framework, be-
ginning with a preview of general considerations towards the science of in-
ternational politics and relations, which have outlined the methodological 
approach to the research field. The second section deals with the fundamen-
tal methodical considerations particular in this study’s context. Following 
this, there will be explanations of the chosen methods of gathering the empir-
ical knowledge for this research. This section is divided into one about deal-
ing with the interviews and one section dealing with the field research in Ko-
sovo. Finally, there will be a short review of the gathered, secondary empiri-
cal date used in the study.  
     
Approach to the Science 
Fundamentally this study has followed an approach that examines the world 
of international politics in the realm of human experiences. This be under-
stood as international relations and politics that can be perceived as a ‘socie-
ty’ of states, where it is essential to understand the people acting on behalf of 
these states, as well as the historical and structural settings the participators 
finds themselves in. As a consequence of this must states and statesmen must 
be given a central place in the analysis of international politics and relation. 
Also notable is that the international organisations always are subordinate to 
the states they consist of. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010:128-30) 
Another basic principle for this study is that values are an inseparable part of 
the political process and relations between statesmen. As values matter, it 
becomes necessary to understand how these values are affecting the deci-
sion-making of individuals taking part in international relations. (Dunne, 
2010:139-140) Thus, international relations are a matter of normativity 
among very certain individuals. 
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To understand and be able to interpret the representatives of both the Koso-
var government and the EU institutions present in the country, this study has 
been done with an empirical background of personal interviews with a num-
ber of individuals involved in the collaboration between the Kosovars and the 
EU. An exposition of the reflections behind this study’s methodology and the 
interviewees follows below. 
 
Methodological Reflections 
In this project the main production of knowledge comes from qualitative in-
terviews conducted during a field trip to Kosovo in November 2011. These 
interviews are therefore the primary empirical knowledge of the study. 
The field of research for the study is in a constant state of flux, as the different 
demands the international society and the Kosovars have to each other vary 
at all times. It has therefore been necessary to focus on more general issues, 
which have some kind of consistency. These have especially been the broader 
lines of Kosovo’s approach to the EU and the independence, the EU institu-
tions mandates and the collaboration between the actors. The empirical re-
search aims to bring forth and to understand important aspects of the cur-
rent situation, not to create new theories or general solutions to the chal-
lenges normally linked with concept of sovereignty.  
To be able to transform interviews into reliable empirical knowledge is both 
careful planning and conduction crucial. The questions must be prepared so 
that they can create a deeper understanding of the field and challenge the 
assumptions of the researchers. It is important to relate the questions to both 
the research field and the theoretical framework, and have an idea of which 
questions can answer which parts of the study. For a thorough exposition of 
these principals, see Kristensen (2010:278-95). In addition to these guide-
lines, interviews are conducted with private individuals. This places strong 
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ethical demands on the researches conducting the interviews and handling 
the results afterwards. This is the case both in regard to the interviewees and 
scientific validity when analysing the transcribed interviews. Informed con-
sent, respecting wishes of anonymity and confidentiality must be upheld 
when handling interviewees. Scientifically is it essential to be true to the con-
text in which the meanings of the answers were conducted. An elaboration is 
found in Kvale & Brinkmann (2009:79-98).  
 
Interviews 
The following section there will be an exposition of the interviewees’ funda-
mental importance for this study and the limits of the interviews. 
Adrian Gashi: Director of the NATO and EU Department under the Foreign Min-
istry of Kosovo. Mr Gashi was able to bring insight to Kosovo’s collaboration 
with the EU institutions; he was also a good representative for the Kosovars 
bureaucracy and their approach to the international presence. The biggest 
limitation of using Mr Gashi is that he might not know the background for 
high-level political priorities within the Kosovar Government.  
Lulzim Mjeku: General Director of the Foreign Ministry of Kosovo. He is the 
highest bureaucrat in Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr Mjeku is there-
fore more involved in the high-level decision making of foreign policies the 
Kosovars have towards the international society. This interview is thus a 
good supplement to the first. As Mr Mjeku was more aware of political state-
ments and their consequences were his answers a little harder to analyse. 
The two last interviewees used in the study asked explicitly for anonymity. 
This is naturally respected, and they are therefore, throughout the study, 
reefed to as ‘EU Official’ and ‘EU Diplomat’. Both their positions are assessed 
to hold the necessary information about EU’s general work in Kosovo and the 
collaboration with the Kosovars to be valuable for this study. Other than this 
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information will there be no further mentions of their positions or which EU 
institutions they are working for, other than for separate EU institutions. Nei-
ther will the transcriptions of the interviews be printed as appendixes in this 
report. Instead there will two be separated appendixes be handed over to the 
adjudicators of this study, and they will be shredded after the examination, as 
they can include hints to identification of the interviewees.  
This of course raises a concern about academic transparency for the study. 
However, based on the ethical code from the former section the confidentiali-
ty of the interviewees is not something that can be omitted. After all, this 
study would not be finalised without these interviews.  
Given that the interviewees have a deferent cultural background it was nec-
essary to take into consider the cross-cultural characteristics of the work. As  
an interviewer in a deferent culture shall have time to be confi-
dential with the new culture and learn some of the many new ver-
bal and non-verbal factors that could be the reason that the inter-
viewers in a deferent culture do not successful reach his or her 
aim. (Kvale 2009:164)   
With a native Danish background was it necessary to be very aware of the 
problems that could appear during the interviews. Unintentional breaches of 
local norms and traditions can create a situation where the interviewees get 
angry or lose attention from the interviews. Cultural research was therefore 
part of the preparation. Doing the interviews in the last half of the field re-
search was also beneficial to this. 
 
The Field Research 
This section will, in short, present the decisions behind traveling to Pristina 
in order to complete this study, and also include what influences the journey 
has had for the outcome.  
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Given the general approach to the science of international politics and rela-
tions the study has benefited greatly by getting first-hand accounts from 
some of the statesmen involved in the collaboration between Kosovo and the 
EU. Through this kind of field research the study tries to create an under-
standing by obtaining the empirical knowledge directly from the individuals 
involved.  
The field research’s main work have been arranging and conducting of the 
interviews, but the interaction with the Kosovar society has been an im-
portant way of crating general knowledge of the research field. This cannot 
be considered date applicable in academics, but the better understanding of 
the field of research has given this study a better starting point as ”the dialog 
and the conversation are essential to understanding of the world” (Warming, 
2009:334). It was never a goal to be an objective observer, interacting in both 
formal and informal settings; attending a governmental conference, sitting in 
cafes or just walking the streets is important for ”… the researcher [that] 
seeks knowledge about the research field through concrete presence. The 
researcher learns to know his research field, by being more or less an active 
part in it” (Warming 2010:314).  
There is no doubt that the field research helped this study through access to 
empirical knowledge that would not have been otherwise available to obtain 
from other places. The decision to do the field research was therefore a very 
important one, making it possible to answer the research question with a 
better perspective.  
 
Secondary Empirical Data 
The secondary empirical data consists predominantly of international resolu-
tions, EU reports and other information from the EU, its different institutions 
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and Kosovo’s government. As an additional supplement this study has also 
used a range of empirical studies from several European universities.  
The use of international agreements, resolutions, and reports has posed a 
challenge as the diplomatic jargon used in those documents may conceal re-
sults of specific negotiation not known to the reader. They may also be for-
mulated in such a way that is open to interpretations difficult to decode for 
even the most experienced scholar of international relations. As a conse-
quence the study is running the risk of deducting meanings not intended by 
the texts. In an effort to respond to this, has the study tried not to use this 
information without any supplementary data to support the conclusions.  
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Chapter 3 
Conceptualising Sovereignty 
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‘The political equivalent to property rights,’ is just one of the historical pur-
poses of sovereignty, according to Stephen D. Krasner (2001). The idea of a 
sovereign has been much different throughout its history.  
Jean Bodin defined a sovereign as someone who made laws, but was not him-
self bound to those laws, in his 1576 The Six Books of the Commonwealth. In 
those days God was the divine authority. Temporary earthly rulers had to 
constrain themselves under God’s and Nature’s laws, but besides those a sov-
ereign monarch had no laws to obey. Seventy-five years later, in his Levia-
than from 1651, Thomas Hobbes defined sovereignty as power, not authority. 
Sovereignty was a monopole of coercive power, whether this was in the form 
of a single ruler, a democratic assembly or something else – as long as this 
sovereign was unchallenged. This distinction has later formed the basis for 
de jure and de facto supreme power, or sovereignty; De jure sovereignty in 
the way that the sovereign have legal authority to define by the laws, while 
de facto sovereignty is based on the ability to command obedience. (Hey-
wood, 2004:90-2)  
Most IR scholars points to the Peace of Westphalia when identifying the event 
responsible for the creation of the sovereign territorial nation-state. This 
perception, however, is false according to Andreas Osiander (2001), since the 
two treaties of the peace neither mentions sovereignty nor independence of 
any of the actors. (pp. 266) Instead  
The process by which the single society of medieval Europe, with 
its intertwining of multiple, “heteronomous” political authorities 
evolved into neatly divided, “sovereign” territorial states was a 
gradual one. (Osiander, 2001:281) 
The French Revolution and in particular the industrialisation was a more es-
sential historical event, which brought congruence between state and society, 
to where each nation-state had their own society different from their neigh-
bours and could ‘be considered complete unto itself’. The concept of sover-
eignty could hereby be identified as more than the domestic concept about 
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power and authority of rulers over subjects, as described by Bodin and 
Hobbes. It would become a key notion in IR, evolved by international lawyers 
in the ninetieth- and twentieth-century, while technological progress enabled 
central administration over large territorial entities and gave greater power 
to central governments, making each state more of a closed circuit in eco-
nomic, political, and social terms. This development produced better inte-
grated and more powerful states, leading to the concept of a sovereign state.  
The developments have since continued and caused a larger interdependence 
across state frontiers, offsetting some of the internal cohesion. This growing 
interdependence, for some translating into globalisation, puts the current 
notion of ‘sovereign state’ under new pressure. (Osiander, 2001:281-3) 
In order to understand the difference between the international and domes-
tic aspects of sovereignty, in which Kosovo’s struggle for independence and 
international recognition is fought and how this affects Kosovo, a theory of 
sovereignty is needed, taking all these features into consideration. 
 
Four Aspects of Sovereignty 
For the many different uses of the term ‘sovereignty’ Krasner (2001) offers a 
brief outline. International lawyers, sociologists, and political scientists have 
all used the term, but in different ways. International lawyers see the sover-
eign state as an autonomous actor with the ability and right to enter contrac-
tual relationships, by which they commit themselves in advance to principals 
and rules and join international and nongovernmental entities managing im-
portant elements of transnational affairs. This is not giving up sovereign 
power, but merely an exercise in its use. For sociologists, the use is some-
thing else entirely. For them, sovereignty is a script stating the state’s legiti-
mate right to exercise authority, and at the same time reject the claim of au-
thority and control by external actors. This script might be decoupled from 
actual behaviour, and whether a state can actually reject external claims is 
 
36 
solely a matter of power. Though this script makes interventions less legiti-
mate, the agreement to shared authority over transnational norms, such as 
universal human rights, can undermine domestic control. (Krasner, 2001:5-
6) 
In political science, the concept of sovereignty has affected all major ap-
proaches of IR. Neoliberals and neorealists have the sovereign state as uni-
tary, territorial and autonomous entities been ‘the basic ontological given’. 
For the English School was the sovereign state perceived as being a sociologi-
cal and historical common norm statesmen was socialised into. (Krasner, 
2001:6) 
Already in 1999, Krasner defined four different aspects of the master concept 
of sovereignty: Domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, interna-
tional legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. All the aspects are con-
cerned with either authority, control, or both. Hence it would be suitable to 
examine Krasner’s definition of these two terms in order to separate them 
from the ancient notion of power and authority. Krasner (1999) refers to 
Thomson (2005) in order to define the difference between control and au-
thority:  
The distinction I want to make is between the claim to exclusive 
right to make rules (authority) and the capability of enforcing that 
claim (control). In short, authority concerns rule-making and con-
trol, rule-enforcement. (…) Authority and control are analytically 
separable but their empirical relationship is of crucial importance 
in understanding and measuring sovereignty. Authority, as the 
working definition offered earlier suggests, is contingent on 
recognition; control depends on concrete capabilities to monitor 
and enforce compliance with the rules that are made under that 
authority. (Thomson, 1995:223) 
Later, Krasner (2001) provides a relation between the two concepts. Authori-
ty is “based on the mutual recognition that an actor has the right to engage in 
a specific activity, including the right to command others. Authority may or 
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may not result in effective control” (Krasner, 2001:7).  If control is not 
achieved through authority it  
can also be achieved through the use of force. If, over a period of 
time, the ability of legitimated entity to control a given domain 
weakens, then the authority of that entity might eventually dissi-
pate. (Krasner, 2001:7) 
Returning to the four aspects of sovereignty, an important notion is that each 
of them is defined differently and not necessarily in connection with one an-
other. In his 1999 study Krasner mainly limited his attention to the relation-
ship between Westphalian and international legal sovereignty (Krasner, 
1999:4). Later he accounts more thoroughly for all the aspects, presenting 
the framework of sovereignty in a way necessary to the understanding of 
how these different aspects of sovereignty works and how they can affect 
each other. (Krasner, 2001:2-19) 
The domestic sovereignty is based on both the state’s authority and control 
within a state. It is the kind of sovereignty figuring when Heywood summa-
rises Bodin’s and Hobbes’s sovereign. In current terms is it the aspect of sov-
ereignty where the polity upholds it legitimacy through authority over and 
control with its territory. This aspect of sovereignty does not, necessarily, 
affect the other aspects of sovereignty. Domestic control and the authority 
within a polity are irrelevant to whether a state is internationally recognised 
and does not guarantee control with the flow of people, ideas, or goods 
across its borders. It might not even be able to secure an absence of authori-
tative external influence.  (Krasner, 2001:2 &7-8) 
Interdependence sovereignty covers governments’ ability to regulate the 
movements of good, capital, peoples, and ideas across their borders. Hence, 
interdependence sovereignty only involves control as the loss of control itself 
does not mean that some other authority structure replaces the state or that 
the state loses its right to regulate. The sovereignty here is connected to the 
scope of activities a state has when more and more transactions are happen-
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ing across its borders. Since interdependence sovereignty is a matter of gov-
ernment response there is no logical relationship between interdependence 
sovereignty and the state’s recognition amongst other states or its ability to 
limit outside influence. However, practically weakened interdependence sov-
ereignty might force a state to negotiate treaties limiting its control with out-
side influence in order to manage the transborder flow. This will, however, 
only be possible if the state is recognised as an independent negotiator in the 
international system and thus having the authority to be at the negotiation 
table. (Krasner, 2001:2 & 8-9)  
International legal sovereignty involves the status of a political entity in the 
international system – that is whether a state is recognised by other states as 
independent. Recognition usually bounded to the juridically independent 
territorial entities only, but can in some cases be concerning specific gov-
ernments. International legal sovereignty is therefore only a matter of au-
thority, not control. This aspect of sovereignty has been used politically 
throughout history. Governments that met the usually criteria for recognition 
have been denied it, and some have received recognition with no control of 
the territory they claimed to govern. International legal sovereignty provides 
both states and their rulers with normative and material resources. The 
recognition opens the possibility to international alliances and negotiations, 
as well as possible enhancement of a ruler’s domestic support because it 
might give access to international resources. Therefore “recognition as a sov-
ereign state is a widely and almost universally understood construct in the 
contemporary world” (Krasner, 2001:10). (Krasner 2001:2 & 9-10) 
Lack of international legal sovereignty, however, does not automatically 
equal lack of domestic control and authority, neither the absent of negotia-
tion rights, and thus is not a necessity for either a state’s domestic or inter-
dependence sovereignty. Despite the possibilities mentioned above, the op-
posite result is not apparent either. International legal sovereignty does not 
by default ensure a state’s domestic or interdependence sovereignty. Just as 
well, international legal sovereignty cannot guarantee the absent of external 
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influence, “obviously, recognition does not guarantee that a state will not be 
invaded or even that its existence will not be extinguished” (Krasner, 
2001:10). 
The last kind of sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, is described as the 
absence of authority external influence. By this is meant that states are de 
facto autonomous and de jure independent, and strictly meaning that exter-
nal authority structures of a state should be excluded from the territory of a 
state so that the authority for a state to make control its territory freely. To 
some degree states have always been constricted by external environments, 
but states have been able to choose freely within this constrained set. West-
phalian sovereignty gives states the ability to determine the character of its 
own domestic sovereignty and its authoritative institutions. With lack of 
Westphalian sovereignty, a de jure independent state be deeply penetrated 
by foreign interests so “a state might claim to be the only legitimate enforce 
of rules within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its 
own making” (Krasner, 2001:2). (Krasner, 2001:2 & 10-11) 
Without Westphalian sovereignty, the potential to weaken domestic sover-
eignty increases as the prolonged external influence might affect a state’s 
domestic authority. As mentioned above, the other aspects of sovereignty 
have strong effects on Westphalian sovereignty, and increasing interdepend-
ence and international legal sovereignty is almost always equivalent with 
more external influence and thus a weakened Westphalian sovereignty. As an 
important comment to this, should it be noted that rulers’ voluntary actions 
as well as forced actions can be the underlying cause of decreasing Westpha-
lian sovereignty. (Krasner, 2001:10-11) 
In summation, these four aspects of sovereignty, both used by analysts and 
practitioners, do not logically imply the erosion of the others if one is lost or 
absent. Empirically, though, effects can be associated with trade-offs between 
the different aspects of sovereignty. (Krasner, 2001:12) A detailed overview 
of the four aspects has been given in Figure 4.1. 
 
40 
 
Figure 4.1: A clearer presentation of Krasner’s four types of sovereignty (Kondrup, 2011:4) 
This framework or grouping of sovereignties creates the theoretical frame-
work enabling this study to identify the strength and weaknesses in Kosovo’s 
struggle for recognised independence, as well as making the distinctions nec-
essary for this study to understand how sovereignty is affecting a political 
entity not fully recognised by the outside world. This understanding will 
make it possible to detect the trade-offs between the different aspects of sov-
ereignty that will further provide this study with understanding on how the 
international presence in Kosovo, as well as the local rulers’ decisions, are 
affecting the sovereignty of Kosovo. 
 
Critique of the Four Aspects 
Few theories in the world of academia are left uncriticised, and Krasner’s 
theory is no exception. This section will take a close look at two of the criti-
cism associated with the four aspects of sovereignty relevant for this study 
and explain how to work pass these. 
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The first critique is from Daniel Philpott (2001). He is arguing that “... Krasner 
fails to account for sovereignty’s power to constitute political authority, a 
power that is not only enduring but also robust, continuous, and expansive” 
(Philpott 2001:310). An important part of this critique is that Krasner’s theo-
ry is too static. It is correct that the four aspects are much locked position. 
(Philpott 2001: 310-1)  
This is of course a serious criticism, but it is this study’s suggestion that the 
different aspect can change in the importance towards one another. Such 
have international legal sovereignty been an important part of state building 
for the last hundred years. Before that nation-building was more concerned 
with domestic and Westphalian sovereignty, because these aspects of the 
states and empires were less secure. Krasner (2001) points to rising im-
portance of interdependence sovereignty with the rise of globalisation. The 
changing importance between the aspects and the trade-off between them 
can hence be considered the flux of the theory. 
The second critic is from David A. Lake (2003) He raises the critique that the 
deviance from Krasner’s theory is not taking enough in to consideration and 
putting it into patterns. “Highlighting anomalies is necessary, of cause, to 
challenge the view of sovereignty as a homogenous, if nonetheless dynamic, 
system wide principle.” (Lake 2003: 310)  He advocates for that it is very im-
portant to bring the deviance in to perspective, so it could be able to finds 
some patterns, so you can develop an analytic scheme. Again is this a critique 
this study had taken into consideration. The critique has, however, been most 
relevant during the initial states of the study, as no abnormalities to the theo-
ry have been found in the Kosovar case. The major limitation here, of course, 
is that Krasner’s theory itself, with its lack of abnormalities have been blind-
ing for actual abnormalities in this case. 
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Operationalization of the Four Aspect of Sovereignty  
This section gives an operationalization on how the four aspects of sover-
eignty are going to be used by this study within the framework of the re-
search question. Some indicators will be presented to show how the different 
aspects of sovereignty can be connected to the context of Kosovo.  
The domestic sovereignty should, as presented in the theory field, distribute 
the law and norms of the society through institutional structures. It is there-
fore important to the process of obtaining domestic sovereignty to take a 
look on the institutions of Kosovo and to see how these are functioning in 
terms of control and authority. Some examples could be institutions like the 
police, the army, and the administrative bureaucracy such as the government 
and the rule of law institutions within the Kosovar society.  
Regarding the interdependence sovereignty, it is also connected to the issue 
of control. In trying to answer the research question, the use of the interde-
pendence sovereignty will be helpful in gaining an insight into whether it is 
possible or not for the Kosovars to control their transborder flows of goods, 
and so on. It has an influence on how the international society looks at Koso-
vo in the terms of their reliability – and if the Kosovars can actually fulfil their 
role as a stabile actor in their transactions. To see if the Kosovars have gained 
any interdependence sovereignty, the study looks into the international co-
operation Kosovo has with the international organisations.  
The international legal sovereignty is more static then the two aspects previ-
ously stated because it is a question of the country having been recognised by 
states and international government organisations. This is a key point in an-
swering the research question. On the other hand, it is not absolute; therefore 
the international legal sovereignty can also be used to determine the degree 
in which Kosovo can obtain international legal sovereignty by partial recogni-
tion, and in terms of having a clearly defined leadership towards the interna-
tional society.  
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Having the supporting basis necessary for the state to supply its population 
its basic needs, such as running water and electricity, or being able to uphold 
an army or border control, is important for Westphalian sovereignty. The 
authority a state gets by its ability to maintain this supply without outside 
help is crucial to limit external presence, thus a necessity for Kosovo to gain 
and uphold Westphalian sovereignty.   
 
The Sovereignty Script 
To be able to put these aspects of sovereignty in relation with Kosovo in its 
current situation and the influence from the international presence, the study 
needs an analytic tool in order to decide how the Kosovars are understanding 
and working with their own authority and control. In other words, how they 
work with the different aspects of their own sovereignty. Given the situation 
of Kosovo, the follow theoretical premise has been a basic assumption for this 
study: 
Once rulers have recognition, they hardly ever want to give it up. 
International legal sovereignty provides an array of benefits (…). 
Because international legal sovereignty is a widely recognised 
script, it makes it easier to organise internal as well as external 
sources. Especially in polities with weak domestic sovereignty, in-
ternational legal sovereignty, international recognition, can pro-
vide a signal to constituents that a regime and its rulers are more 
likely to survive and thereby make it more likely that these con-
stituents would support the regime. (Krasner, 1999:41) 
A sovereignty script in this study is thus a script of sovereignty through in-
ternational recognition. A useful example of how such a script of (interna-
tional legal) sovereignty can be used by politicians, Michael McFaul (2001) 
provided a study about domestic control between two political fractions in 
the former Soviet Union. The script of Kosovo will, of course, have been heav-
ily influenced by the international presences there and not an internal politi-
cal dispute. Nonetheless this aids the study with a theoretical foundation to 
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identify what the Kosovars have gained by proclaimed independence and in 
their efforts to gain broad international recognition. 
McFaul (2001:198) shows that a declaration of sovereignty or script of ‘in-
ternational legal sovereignty’, by the very existence of sovereignty as a norm 
in the contemporary international system, can change political outcomes by 
giving the politicians who use this script both domestic and international 
benefits. 
Claiming sovereignty and receiving recognition can constitute a ruler, making 
it easier to gather domestic support, both because they are in a position to 
promote the interest of their constituents and because the recognition is a 
signal of viability both for as a leader and for the leaders’ regime. The script 
also creates internal or domestic alliances by defining clear lines between “us 
and them.” By this ability leaders can really the troops against a defined ene-
my and gather further domestic support. (McFaul, 2001:199) 
Another clear advantage of the sovereignty script is that if international legal 
sovereignty is obtained at least partially, it limits transaction costs in dealing 
with international actors and other states (given that they recognise one’s 
state). It also can also provide the ability to access international resources 
through negotiations only available to sovereign states. A declaration of in-
dependence often upsets the status quo, as secession is not a norm in the in-
ternational system. For this to succeed it is necessary to frame the sovereign-
ty script in a way that fully seeks to be integrated into the international 
community. A way to do this is by leaders articulating “distinctly pro-
Western goals” (McFaul, 2001:205). A pledge to neoliberal market economy, 
multi-national elections, and avoiding rhetoric of ethic nationalism, has 
proved important. Furthermore, refraining from the use of violence has been 
proven to show that the claim of sovereignty does not threaten to throw the 
region into war and instability. This is also essential for leaders to show 
themselves as reliable and cooperative partners with the West (who was the 
implicit first recognisers in McFaul’s study). The end result of these 
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measures, however, is rather limited before securing some level of domestic 
sovereignty. (McFaul, 2001:2004-7) 
The commitment to retain the status quo from other states is a difficult barri-
er for a sovereignty script to break through. International legal sovereignty is 
a structurally induced equilibrium and breaking the rules of the game would 
signal that others can follow and make their own claims on sovereignty, thus 
having negative repercussions for the sovereignty regime as a whole. This 
explains why many leaders in the international community do not have the 
incentive to deflect from this rule by recognising claims of sovereignty to 
leaders without undisputed domestic sovereignty. As a consequence, interna-
tional legal sovereignty usually follows changes in either domestic or West-
phalian sovereignty. (McFaul, 2001:208-10) 
The consequences of being granted international legal sovereignty is a loss of 
Westphalian sovereignty. In particular, if part of the sovereignty script is able 
to show alliances with the West and the ability to take part in the interna-
tional society and integrating the norms, rules and institutions of the West. 
International financial institutions, implementing liberal markets, democratic 
institutions, and respecting human rights, are all examples of willingness to 
forfeit Westphalian sovereignty in order to gain international recognition 
(legal sovereignty). (McFaul, 2001:210-12) 
This script is the choice of governments. Even though the domination norm 
throughout the international society is the idea of the international recog-
nised, ‘sovereign, territorial state’ it does not equal the only option. Local 
government of to-be states can choose to follow this script, or the can try to 
focusing on the other aspects of sovereignty. A government could for example 
build up so much domestic control and authority (domestic sovereignty) that 
international recognition would lose some of its importance. Some would say 
this has been done in the case of Somaliland in north-western Somalia.  
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It is then fair to conclude that the sovereignty script deployed for immediate 
political goals, in turn, have long-term consequences that few might antici-
pate or desire (McFaul, 2001:204). However, this does not mean that the con-
sequences of the script are determined by the script itself – it depends on the 
decisions of the government in question, when the script is first made. For 
the Kosovars, that is their declaration of independence. 
 
Operationalizing the Script 
Having defined sovereignty as a melting pot of four different aspects, which 
might or might not interact, it is essential to theoretically propose an idea 
about how the Kosovars can work with these aspects. Combining these as-
pects with the idea of the sovereignty script, this study has this theoretical 
background to dive down into the empirical field of Kosovo’s claim to inde-
pendence, and inside of this background, see how the international communi-
ty is influencing the country’s sovereignty directly related to the decisions of 
the Kosovars. 
The use of all of these aspects of sovereignty are in a state of flux and in the 
analysis be seen as different aspects of sovereignty which interact closely 
together, creating a scenario of constant trade-off between the different as-
pects of sovereignty. When one follows a script of sovereignty through inter-
national recognition (international legal sovereignty), this will certainly af-
fect the other aspects of sovereignty. 
 
Choice of Theory 
With an already narrow field of theory just concerning ‘sovereignty’ it can 
seem strange that this study have made the field even narrower, by only 
choosing one major theory: The Four Aspects of Sovereignty. However, the 
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choice made gives the study the capabilities of taking a very specific and clear 
approach the analysis of the research question. More theories could easily be 
added, but not without losing the clear line between the research question 
and the study’s conclusion. Thus the narrow focus on Krasner, with the note 
that McFaul’s idea of the sovereignty script was necessary to determined how 
which aspects of sovereignty was the dominant and how the Kosovars actual-
ly brought their sovereignty into the stage of the international society.  
Krasner’s theory is a very eloquent one; it frames the big term of sovereignty 
into one theory without throwing away the fact that ‘sovereignty’ can be 
many different things. It is therefore very relevant to this study. Instead of 
trying to assemble a new theoretical framework of many different theories, 
Krasner gives the overall frame, where only the addition of the script is need-
ed, thus making room for this study to concentrate its focus on the research, 
the analysis and the discussion of the findings.  
By unifying the term sovereignty from many different fields and traditions 
within international relations is Krasner not confined to a single science. The 
interdisciplinary between international law, sociology, political science and 
international relations broadens both the theories relevance and theoretical 
utility.  
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Chapter 4 
Kosovo’s Sovereignties  
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The aim for this study’s analysis is to determine how the Kosovars have used 
their declaration of independence to obtain international recognition and 
how this have created a situation in which limited recognition and interna-
tional presence have continued to affect the sovereignty of Kosovo. The first 
part of the analysis seeks to provide a starting point by analysing Kosovo’s 
aspects of sovereignty prior to the declaration of independence. The second 
part will outline Kosovo’s road map to independence, the approach to sover-
eignty they followed and why Kosovo’s leaders chose that particular path. 
Why they chose the sovereignty script. Thereafter will the third part take a 
closer look at the interests the EU have in engaging itself in Kosovo, and the 
sovereignty consequences hereof. The fourth part of the analysis will analyse 
the cooperation between Kosovo and the EU institutions today to establish an 
understanding of the process and how the actual implementation of EU’s in-
terests are affecting Kosovo’s sovereignty. Thereafter the analysis will de-
termine how the sovereignty script and the EU presence currently affect the 
sovereignty of Kosovo. Lastly does the concluding section, “Sovereignty 
trade-offs”, summarises the immediate findings of the study. 
  
Establishment of International Presence 
The international society has been engaged in the governance of Kosovo 
since UN Security Council Resolution 1244 was passed. An international 
presence stretching from the end of the armed conflict of 1999 and up till to 
today. Due to this timespan both the international presences and mandates in 
Kosovo have developed, most notably by the declaration of independence. 
This part of the study will focus on the establishment of the international 
mandates and the effects it had on Kosovo up to the point of independence.  
UNMIK has been in place in Kosovo since Resolution 1244 was passed, and is 
still present in Kosovo today with a small number of representatives, and still 
working under that same resolution and with the same mandate. (UNMIK, 
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2011) The resolution was passed to stop the conflict and the humanitarian 
crisis in the region and to insure the stability of Kosovo so it could be possible 
for refugees to return home (UN, 1999). UNMIK took over every institution, 
from reconstruction infrastructure and civilian administrative functions, over 
maintaining law and order, establishing a local police force to organise and 
oversee local and provisional development of democratic and governmental 
institutions, including holding elections (UN, 1999). This is the first step, tak-
en by the international society, to take control over the area. When dealing 
with this resolution, and the situation it left on the ground it must be taken 
into consideration that the case of Kosovo is a sui generis one. Never before 
have the international society to such a degree taken over local governance. 
(Reka, 2003) It is therefore necessary to look a Kosovo in this perspective.  
The Kosovars did not have a lot of sovereignty in any of its four aspects be-
fore the intervention in 1999. Officially, there had been no local institutions 
since the Serbs took control over Kosovo in 1991. However, the Kosovars 
upheld a non-authorised parliament as well as parallel institutions for the 
Albanian population. This lasted roughly until the armed conflict between 
Serbs and Albanians began to escalate in 1997 (Judah, 2008).  
The quasi-government and the parallel institutions, which had their legitima-
cy within the Kosovo Albanian population, illustrates that even under Serbian 
rule, the political elite of Kosovo had some form of limited domestic sover-
eignty in the area, in the form of authority and control over the parallel insti-
tutions. None of the other aspects of sovereignty can be said to have been 
present due to first Yugoslavian, and then Serbian, supremacy.  
In 1999 US President, Bill Clinton, defended the intervention in Kosovo, and 
even though he articulated that Serbian forces had to leave if the Kosovars 
was to return home and live in safety, there were no mention of sovereignty 
or independence for Kosovo (Clinton, 1999). He was very much in sync with 
Resolution 1244’s text: 
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[T]he political process towards the establishment of an interim 
political framework agreement providing a substantial self-
government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet ac-
cords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia… (UN, 1999:5) 
Resolution 1244 makes it clear that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia is reaffirmed by all UN member states. Further it multiple times 
refers to the Rambouillet Accords, which Serbia rejected, even though the 
compromise would keep Kosovo linked with Serbia, but with considerable 
autonomy (MacShane, 2011). (UN, 1999) As well as the Rambouillet Accords 
did, Resolution 1244 also gave the Kosovars a considerable amount of auton-
omy: “Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for a substantial autonomy 
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo” (UN, 1999:2). The fact that 
UNMIK was to establish an interim administration for Kosovo was definitely 
the first steps in a process that could fertilise the soil for later self-
government for Kosovo. In this light the international presence, was in 1999 
a clear opportunity to achieve more domestic sovereignty for the Kosovars, 
even though it was not to result in an internationally recognised, sovereign 
state, thus not gaining Kosovo any international legal sovereignty. 
This opportunity of obtaining more domestic sovereignty was realised with 
the establishment of the Kosovo Assembly in 2001, which, in collaboration 
with UNMIK, was acting as the provisional self-government (UNMIK, 2001). 
Though still with the UN mandate and the Special Representative to the Secu-
rity-General (SRSG) in the role of “overseeing the development of the provi-
sional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UN, 1999:3). In this 
way, the Kosovars would get formalised institution by which they would be 
able to gain domestic sovereignty by regenerate local norms and traditions. 
Westphalian Sovereignty was yet a long way from achieved as Kosovo was 
still heavily dependent on UNMIK for the structural life-support mentioned 
earlier. 
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The extract from Resolution 1244 is granting the Kosovars more domestic 
sovereignty, but not to the extent of a sovereign state. The UNMIK is simply 
taking the overall authority of the country to ensure safety and development. 
Thus working against the domestic sovereignty is the lack of Westphalian 
sovereignty. Not only in form of UNMIK, but also due to the rest of the inter-
national presence in form of KFOR, and in the fact that the SRSG had “sole and 
executive legislative powers [over] sovereignty-related matters” (Blumi, et 
al., 2003:16). These external influences diminish the ability to which the new 
assembly was able to form its institutions and arrange its own security.  
Despite reaffirming Serbia’s sovereignty, Resolution 1244 did not translate 
into continued Serbian control over Kosovo when the Secretary-General’s 
Special Envoy, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, in March 2007 an-
nounced his reports on Kosovo’s Future Status (Ahtisaari, 2007a) and the 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari, 2007b) 
in which he concludes that Kosovo’s future status should be independence 
supervised by the international community. Also Ahtisaari is referring to Ko-
sovo as a case not seen before: “Kosovo is a unique case that demands a 
unique solution” (Ahtisaari 2007a:4). The reports, later known as the 
Ahtisaari Plan, were supported by the three permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council from the West. Russia, on the other hand, sided with Serbia and 
vetoed the plan’s implementation (Vogel, 2008:2). 
As by the time Kosovo’s Assembly declared the state for independent, had the 
state some limited domestic sovereignty. This domestic authority and control 
had been built, first through parallel institutions under Serbian supremacy 
and later through the self-governmental assembly established by the UNMIK. 
This domestic sovereignty is severely limited by UNMIK’s ability to overrule 
assembly decisions, by the lack of Westphalian sovereignty, and also by UN-
MIK’s and KFOR’s presence. As mentioned was international legal sovereign-
ty not part of Resolution 1244 or the international presence, and in continua-
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tion of this absence did Kosovo neither have any interdependence sovereign-
ty by the time of independence. 
 
Independence: A Script of Sovereignty 
Kosovo’s independence, or rather the leaders behind the independence, fol-
lowed a classic script: independence by international recognition of sover-
eignty. So in the terminology of the four aspects, independence was sought by 
acquiring international legal sovereignty. If this is true, must the internation-
al presence that has continued as a part of Kosovo’s governance, even after 
the declaration of independence be a consequence of that script. In order to 
understand this choice, it is necessary to understand why the Kosovar politi-
cians at the time of independence acted the way they did. What made the Ko-
sovars create a script of sovereignty trough international recognition, but 
give up the rhetoric and rights normally thought to apply when peoples de-
clare independence from either colonisers or historical occupation? Kosovo 
instead accepted the continuous presence of international organisations with 
corrective and executive powers. 
The sovereignty script that Kosovo’s politicians followed at the time of inde-
pendence had the purpose to gain Kosovo international recognition, not limit 
international influence. Asdren Gashi, Director of Kosovo’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs’ EU and NATO Department, explains: 
[A]fter 1999 [it] took years to rebuild, and reorganise the whole 
country and to build a new nation. After we started rebuild the 
country we entered in a process of building a state which was fi-
nalised with the declaration of the independence of Kosovo, after 
that we entered in the phase of recognition internationally of our 
country. (Gashi, 2011:8) 
This quote shows that Kosovo’s leaders, at this time, assessed that they had 
gained enough domestic sovereignty, even under UNMIK administration, to 
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be able to declare independence with their population behind them and the 
institutions necessary to run a country.  
The declaration both states that the independence is in accordance with the 
Ahtisaari Plan and that the new state will honour and respect the obligations 
of the plan and implements it fully. Further it welcomes the ICO and EULEX 
presence, as well as it welcomes NATO to retain its mission in Kosovo. (Koso-
vo, 2008a)  
The implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan had visible short term effects, as 
Gashi is saying: “... when we declared our independency we took the Ahtisaari 
Plan and we adopted the Ahtisaari Plan in our constitution.” (Gashi 2011:5) 
This willingness to meet the international society is understandable when 
reading into the Kosovo’s Future Status report, because: “Kosovo shall have 
the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the 
right to seek membership in international organizations” (Ahtisaari 2007a:6). 
So Kosovo will evidently acquire the rights of every other sovereign state. 
The implementation of the plan in their constitution was the opportunity for 
the Kosovars to engage their script for international recognition, by leaning 
towards western norms.  
The declaratory text is not the only indication of welcoming attitude of Koso-
vo towards the West. Today the Kosovars do a huge effort in implementing 
laws leading towards the EU. The fact that Kosovo is not recognised by all EU 
countries and therefore cannot negotiate with EU as a whole poses an obvi-
ous hindrance. This means that the country does not have the same roadmap 
towards the EU as the other Balkan countries. (Gashi, 2011) According to 
Gashi Kosovo are still trying to adopt these different criteria and reforms 
without any requests from the EU, simply as preparations for the day Kosovo 
will be able to negotiate with EU unilaterally.  
Implementing the Ahtisaari Plan, however, does not mean that Kosovo have 
an interest in being supervised. The signs of this problematic will be ad-
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dressed in the last part of the analysis. But a number of upsides at the time of 
independence can be identified:  
Kosovo’s recognisers, the West, had supported the plan since it was first pre-
sented to the Security Council, and when Kosovo’s leaders had to deal with 
the northern municipalities or Serbia had the plan a convenient consensus 
with the Kosovars own idea of the countries northern demarcation, so they 
could, and still can, refuse to discuss anything else, as expressed by the inter-
viewed EU Diplomat (EU Diplomat, 2011). Hence the Ahtisaari plan had the 
qualities to become a centrepiece in the Kosovars plan towards international-
ly recognised independence – their sovereignty script. 
Domestically, 109 electorates of the Assembly voted in favour of the declara-
tion of independence, a number which included every member of the Albani-
an majority, and every minority electorate, except the 11 Serbian members 
who boycotted the vote (Kosovo, 2008b). This action clearly illustrates a 
power of the sovereignty script to bind alliances against a political alterna-
tive. Hence the act of declaring independence effectively gathered broad sup-
port of the Kosovar leadership and their decision to declare independence in 
2008.  
These local politicians had limited authority as leaders and even less control 
because of the UNMIK administration. Lulzim Mjeku, Director General of Ko-
sovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, describes how the independence have 
changed this for the government, with the fact that even when government 
explicitly, for one reason or another, does not recognise Kosovo as an inde-
pendent country, they still address the current government about their deci-
sion giving them some legitimacy as leaders. (Mjeku, 2011) The Kosovar poli-
ticians are now the natural leaders, whether the foreign government defines 
Kosovo as a province or a country. 
Currently, this political interests of showing control and gain legitimacy is 
still present in Pristina more than three years after the independence. By be-
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ing a part of negotiations with Serbia, facilitated by the EU, the government in 
Pristina can spin their participating, as being a fulfilled actor dealing with the 
EU and Serbia, as advancement in terms of sovereignty. (EU Diplomat, 2011)  
Thus the script of recognised sovereignty has personal advantages for the 
Kosovar leaders, who during the UNMIK period had gained representation in 
Kosovo’s Assembly. In both examples above, is the script of recognised sov-
ereignty gaining the Kosovar politicians domestic authority. As McFaul 
(2001) describes, bringing yourself in a position, as a leader, where foreign 
governments recognise “your” claim of independence; are willing to negoti-
ate with you; and agree to send the international support you ask of them, 
you legitimacy as a leader will rise, giving you more domestic political sup-
port. 
A sovereignty script can also create allies across borders, by showing poten-
tial partners one’s reliability and commitment to be part of the international 
system. Both the two interviewed Kosovars from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, the declaration of independence, the constitution and the Ahtisaari Plan 
(Mjeku, 2011, Gashi, 2011, Kosovo, 2008a, Kosovo, 2008c & Ahtisaari, 
2007a), ensure “Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, 
guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under 
the law” (Kosovo, 2008a:2), giving a very strong example on how this script 
of sovereignty, after typically western norms, ensure the Kosovars’ rhetoric 
avoided ethnic nationalism, and approached the West in order to show Koso-
vo as a reliable partner.  
Returning now, to the reforms and roadmap being implemented by Kosovo to 
accommodate full EU recognition from earlier (Gashi, 2011). Kosovo can by 
establishing a close alliance with the West secure a continuance of the devel-
opment UNMIK had started in 2001, to make Kosovo a more prosperous 
place to live. The Kosovars wanted, and still wants, economic development 
through free trade economy, which can be achieved first though trade with 
the EU, later by entering the free marked as a candidate state and finally as a 
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member of the EU. Who better to build the institutions needed to achieve this 
than EU itself? For this to happen the political framework had to be reformed, 
from Communism to Democracy, and again would international organisa-
tions be the most direct way to implement them. NATO presence continued 
to secure the safety for the development from being an “occupied country to 
… reorganise ourselves as a free country, to build institutions, to build every-
thing: school system, social systems, health system…” (Gashi, 2011:9). And 
finally the transition from being a country at war to one in peace, even if it 
meant sending their now former prime minister to The Hague to face trials 
for war crimes. (Gashi, 2011)  
All of this required recognition from the EU states and therefore is it still vital 
for the Kosovars to point out to the five non-recognisers in the EU that Koso-
vo is a unique case, not comparable with the minorities within their borders. 
Not before these five states recognise Kosovo as independence can EU as a 
whole recognise and deal with Kosovo as a united entity, and over a longer 
timespan give Kosovo the change of becoming a candidate- and member state 
of the EU. (Gashi, 2011 & Mjeku, 2011)  
To show both the uniqueness of Kosovo and their reliability, kept the Koso-
vars strictly to the sovereignty script. As determined earlier is the Ahtisaari 
Plan very much the essence of Kosovo’s claim of independence and “... Pristi-
na doesn't want to discuss anything else but the Ahtisaari Plan, and the 
Ahtisaari Plan is already consensus in their own views” (EU Diplomat, 
2011:9). The quote confirms that the Kosovars are determined to follow the 
script towards independence and state sovereignty by leaning towards the 
West. This approach has meant that the Kosovars have been able to hold on 
to the northern territories, determined by the plan to be within their borders. 
This has been troublesome, but also a problem Kosovo could deal with “in 
coordination with the international presence here to find a solution, and that 
solution always will be in order to integrate that part of the country in a non-
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violent way” (Mjeku 2011:26). In that way have Kosovo used the plan to act 
as a responsible partner in the international society. 
By basing the independence of Kosovo on a script of international recognised 
sovereignty created the political elite of Kosovo a very clear set of gains. 
Building the script on the Ahtisaari Plan, a plan that itself granted Kosovo 
formal sovereignty and independence, secured Kosovo both the northern 
parts of the country and won allies among their most wanted, the West. Fur-
ther did the independence claim unify most politicians domestically. Domes-
tic political stability and foreign support were both necessities in order to 
continue the development towards free trade economy, democracy, EU 
membership and progressing with the capacity building needed to improve 
domestic institutions; institutions which added to the limited domestic sov-
ereignty. 
Declaring independence won the leaders legitimacy through international 
diplomacy, a legitimacy that gained them domestic authority as an independ-
ent government, and more than sub-administrators under UNMIK. Through 
those recognitions they received and their negotiations with Serbia did Koso-
vo also get the status as a political entity within the international system, 
even though not as a fully integrated member state. And by approaching the 
West did they try to ensure more control over trade, in- and outflow of goods, 
people, capital and ideas, hence doing an effort to gain interdependence sov-
ereignty. Nothing in the declaration or the interviews, however, indicates that 
the script for Kosovo’s independence worked towards the goal of limited ex-
ternal authority over domestic structures and institutions. On the contrary 
did the declaration of the independence and multiply interviews point in the 
direction of the opposite by inviting EULEX, ICO and KFOR, as well as contin-
uously seeking closer ties to the EU. Thus giving away influence to external 
authorities is a way for Kosovo to gain further recognition. Whether the Ko-
sovars really had any other options towards independence will also be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
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European Interest 
An obvious necessity for the sovereignty script to work is Western response 
to the invitation above. Given NATO forces and UNMIK already in Kosovo, 
this seems certain, but the EU would still have to show an interest in stepping 
up its engagement as a consequence of the independence, plus willingness to 
deal with the diplomatic disagreement with Russia, who had vetoed the 
Ahtisaari Plan in the Security Council. The EU institutions did become well 
engaged in Kosovo, and this part of the analysis looks into the interests the 
EU have in being present in Kosovo, along with immediate effects of the pres-
ence, on the Kosovo’s aspects of sovereignty. 
When presented with the possibility of taking a more active role in the area, 
where the EU countries not without incitement to do so. The EU Diplomat 
explains: “… if Kosovo is unstable, the rest of the region [Western Balkan] is 
unstable” (EU Diplomat, 2011:11). The main reason for EU’s interest in sta-
bility of the Kosovo region kept coming up in various reports and in the in-
terviews made in Pristina: Kosovo is in the backyard of the EU, and the EU 
very much has an interest in keeping stability in their backyard. (Gashi, 2011, 
EU Diplomat, 2011 & Mjeku, 2011) Also helping the process was that:  
The European Council has repeatedly confirmed that Kosovo 
shares the European perspective of the Western Balkans. This 
communication identifies the community instruments the EU can 
mobilize to promote Kosovo’s political and socio-economic devel-
opment. Kosovo has achieved a certain political stability, but the 
security situation remains fragile. Kosovo must not be left behind 
as the Western Balkan region progresses towards the EU. (EU, 
2009:13)  
This interest of stabilising the region is, in particular, related to avoiding 
save-heavens for organised crime, trafficking and preventing refugee flows 
from the potential conflicts (Gheciu, 2006). The objective of stability is not 
the only reason for the EU’s engagement in Kosovo, trade and cultural as-
pects are others (ICO, 2011b), but it has definitely been found to be a key el-
ement for the overall international presence in Kosovo (Gheciu, 2006).  
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Article 11 in the Treaty on European Union does tell how the EU can engage 
itself through foreign and security policy, in order to reach the goal of stabil-
ity in Kosovo, by; “… develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (EU 2006:14). Thus 
can the overreaching goal of EU’s foreign policy become the mean to stabilise 
Kosovo. 
The protection of the northern, Serb-dominated municipals and the other 
minorities spread throughout Kosovo provides an important aspect of the 
Ahtisaari Plan: to ensure ethnic diversity, minority rights, democracy and so 
forth. The plan reads as follows:  
Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democrati-
cally and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level 
of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental free-
doms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such princi-
ples. (Ahtisaari 2007a:6)  
This extract of the Ahtisaari Plan fits perfectly with Article 11 from the EU 
Treaty, giving a solid basis for EU engagement, by showing dedication to 
Western norms. Additionally did the implementing of the Ahtisaari Plan raise 
the incitement for the European counties further, qua the controlling form of 
the international engagement in Kosovo, thus heightening EU’s ability to con-
trol the development and secure stability:  
An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provide 
for at future international civilian and military presence in Koso-
vo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the 
competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability 
throughout Kosovo. (Ahtisaari 2007a:6) 
The EU interest is a clear gain in international legal sovereignty for the Koso-
vars. By using the Ahtisaari Plan, which has been ratified in Kosovo’s declara-
tion of independence only – not by the UN – does the countries engaged in 
accordance to the plan, automatically recognise Kosovo, because they follow 
a plan only valid if Kosovo’s independence is accepted. Even despite of the 
five non-recognising country, does the EU institutions in Pristina still deal 
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with the Kosovar government, giving them credibility that transfer into a 
stronger domestic sovereignty, even though the country still has not been 
unanimous recognised by the international society as a whole. This, however, 
does only hold for the Albanian parts of Kosovo. With regard to the northern 
areas the lack of government control does limit the domestic sovereignty 
here to almost none.  
The other important point in the first quotation above is the last sentience. In 
this the Ahtisaari Plan dictates the content of the new Kosovar constitution. 
This is one of the clearest examples on revoking Westphalian sovereignty, or 
in the case of Kosovo, never granting it, by external influence. It is clear that 
Westphalian sovereignty was not a sovereignty aspect the Kosovars had be-
fore independence, but by granting extensive authority the constitutionally 
text have the Kosovars accepted not gaining any Westphalian sovereignty in 
the process of a trade-off for international legal sovereignty. At least to some 
degree an important part of most claims of independence. With this lack of 
Westphalian sovereignty has domestic sovereignty also been lost in the pro-
cess by forcing international norms into the founding document of the state 
of Kosovo, thereby weakening the authority of the constitution. This trade-off 
between gaining and losing domestic sovereignty will be addressed more 
explicitly later in the study. 
 
A Work in Progress… 
Despite the engagement from most of the EU countries, does the five non-
recognition countries hinder a plain approach towards Kosovo for the EU as a 
whole, which means the “EU has this big paradox that Kosovo is really im-
portant to us, but we really don't agree on how to define it” (EU Diplomat, 
2011:17).  
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The EU institutions in Kosovo are working under a certain mandate, and the 
European engagement in the region is frequently depending on agreements 
in the European Commission and EU Parliament. So when their members 
have different definitions of Kosovo’s status, as either a province or an inde-
pendent state, can it sometimes be very difficult to interpret what the actual-
ly mandate is. (EU Diplomat, 2011 & EU Official, 2011) The mandate of the EU 
institutions will in this section be elaborated regarding the EULEX, EUSR and 
ECLO and once again put in the perspective of the influence it has on the sov-
ereignty of Kosovo.  
The most interesting of the EU institutions currently engaged in Kosovo is the 
EULEX, they have been given executive powers on certain aspects of law en-
forcement and the jurisdiction, as “the European Union Rule of Law Mission 
in Kosovo will be conducted in a situation which may deteriorate and could 
harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy...” (EU 
2008:2) The function of EULEX is specified in the Joint Action Plan for Koso-
vo:  
EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial au-
thorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards 
sustainability and accountability and in further developing and 
strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and 
multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these insti-
tutions are free from political interference and adhering to inter-
nationally recognised standards and European best practices. (EU, 
2008:2)  
This is problematized by the interviewed EU Official, because EULEX are 
working under circumstances where the EU system cannot tell them what the 
“standards” and “best practices” are, making their mandate confusing. The EU 
Official is also questioning how far it is possible to go regarding the mandate. 
Since the EU institutions do not have the same support from all the EU coun-
tries they do not know when they have acted in a way that crosses certain 
lines regarding Kosovo’s statehood and claim of independence, leading to 
corrections from Brussels. (EU Official, 2011) This problematic fact of an un-
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specific mandate is also affecting the work of the EUSR, because the Europe-
an Commission cannot acknowledge the fact that they are engaged in the 
‘state of Kosovo’, because of the five non-recognisers. (EU Diplomat, 2011)  
The mandates, confusing or difficult to interpret, can be the reason the re-
sults of the process of rule of law and democratising is going slower than ex-
pected. It is a concern expressed by the Director General in the Foreign Min-
istry: “In this case, mission of EULEX has been slow to establish its activity 
and to stretch all over the territory of Kosovo, and we’re waiting for some 
more results” (Mjeku 2011:29).  
The Ahtisaari Plan stated that institutions such as EULEX should “... have lim-
ited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effec-
tive and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot 
control” (Ahtisaari, 2007a:8), but most of these powers still lies with UNMIK. 
The reason for this is found in the fact that the UN Security Council never rat-
ified the plan, thus making it impossible for EULEX to ‘inherit’ these abilities. 
Therefore does EULEX only have executive powers on some areas of serious 
crime, such as war crimes and organised crime. (Derks & Price, 2010) This is 
confirmed by the EU Official: 
… well, that there are five non-recognising states in the EU, but 
mainly, because we never received the mandate from the Security 
Council to replace the UN[MIK], and that Kosovo’s independence 
process have been kind of painful. (EU Official, 2011:19) 
This is backed locally, again in a way that clearly shows the demanding ap-
proach of the Kosovars: “... we [Kosovo] expect that they [EULEX] will help us 
in law enforcement, fighting organised crime, corruption where they have 
this executive power” (Gashi, 2011:5). Only a few big investigations have 
been initiated during 2010 through the executive mandate of EULEX. Among 
others a central bank governor and the minister of transportation, but not 
without some level of resistance from the Kosovars (EU, 2010:13).  
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The problem of these missing corrective and limited executive abilities is in-
dicated by the EU Diplomat describing an example of how the parallel institu-
tions are disconnected from each other:  
EULEX prosecutors simply have the right to start investigations. 
This doesn’t mean that the Kosovar prosecutor, if he wants, can't 
do the same - he is not in the fields where EULEX has executive 
powers. (EU Diplomat, 2011:5) 
On most other issues does the EULEX only have a Monitoring, Mentoring and 
Advising (MMA) mandate. This is not a long term mandate to ensure an insti-
tution-building process, but more of a capacity building process that slowly 
will disappear (EU Official, 2011 & Derks & Price, 2010). The Kosovars does 
not necessarily see this as a limitation they wish to cooperate with a EULEX 
without any corrective power, but as an MMA: “... we invited them because 
we might have some lack of experiences lack of capacity in these years, and 
we were also believing having them here will support us [and] continues to 
support us...” (Gashi 2011:7).  
The EULEX is not the only EU institution, which have had a strange position 
in Kosovo’s intermezzo of international representation. The position of EUSR 
lost all its corrective and executive powers when the position separated from 
that of the ICR: “… before there was a double-heading between ICR and EUSR 
… now we are possibly going towards a double-heading between the head of 
the Commission and the EUSR” (EU Diplomat, 2011:6). The EU Official is 
mentioning that ECLO are established with a better financial background, 
hence making it a bit easier to work without corrective and executive powers, 
because the Kosovars are more willing to work with the EU institution when 
there is money to support the capacity building. (EU Official, 2011) The soon-
to-be doublet-heading of ECLO and EUSR will hence become a stronger au-
thority in the EU’s presence as they have a money-backed mandate. 
The collaboration between Kosovo and the EU is summed up by the diplomat:  
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EU is in a way very engaged, but it could be more engaged. Let’s 
put it like this: In the whole of the Balkans the EU is the main 
game in town, because in the expansion project, because it is the 
largest donor and everything. Kosovo is in partial an exception at 
least since 2008. (EU Diplomat, 2011:10) 
And this does definitely come with some heavy consequences for the Koso-
vars, who: “don't have any signed agreement with EU for anything. We were 
expecting to have the free trade agreement which is still not signed because 
of this lack of addressing our country…” (Gashi, 2011:4). This is a problem for 
Kosovo, since they want to progress towards the EU’s Aquis Communautaire.  
Though it is difficult to determine how the weak mandates and continuous 
presence of the EU institutions are affecting the aspects of Kosovo’s sover-
eignty, there are some strong trends. The lack of international legal sover-
eignty is the direct reason for the weak mandates, both in terms of the miss-
ing corrective powers and mixed signals from the EU countries. This is due to 
lack of recognition in the Security Council and the EU respectively. As it is 
hard to lose international legal sovereignty, already gained, Kosovo will not 
lose recognition due to weak mandates. But if the goal of appearing recogni-
tion-worthy is to be kept, slow progress might damage the possibilities for 
further international recognition.  
That the mandates in some ways are confusing and difficult to interpret can 
affect the other sovereignty aspects of Kosovo as well. It gives the Kosovars 
the opportunity to build some domestic sovereignty because they can de-
mand further and quicker results, and work without fear of corrections from 
the EU institutions. This gives the Kosovars more freedom to take the author-
ity and the control. The little domestic sovereignty gained by this does not 
help Kosovo’s lack of Westphalian sovereignty though. As the international 
organisations are still the main providers of development for Kosovo. The 
weak mandates might slow this process, but as is still exist it will continue to 
obstruct a rise in Westphalian sovereignty. Combine this with a EUSR head-
ing the Commission’s Liaisons Office, who is able to influence more power 
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through the financing, is there not a lot of hope to gain any Westphalian sov-
ereignty in the near future.  
Overall does the missing international legal sovereignty still work against the 
interdependence sovereignty, creating weaker mandates and prevent the 
ability to make unilateral agreements with the EU.  None of these outcomes 
work towards closer integration with the EU, and will therefore not promote 
Kosovo’s interdependence sovereignty from the current state of bilateral 
agreements with separate countries.  
 
Long Term Consequences of the Script 
The last part of the analysis will draw on some of the findings from earlier, to 
determine how the sovereignty script and the EU presence currently affect 
the sovereignty of Kosovo.  
The process toward the EU has already been long for Kosovo. The first steps 
were taken before the sovereignty script had resulted in the declaration of 
independence:  
Kosovo has inherited, some laws and regulations previously, pre-
viously before the, its independence due to the, work of the inter-
im institutions with the UNMIK United Nation Mission. And these 
laws are hopefully in accordance to the Acquis Communitare. 
(Mjeku, 2011:25) 
Given the many common goals between the Kosovar government and the text 
of the declaration on the one hand side and the EU’s foreign and security pol-
icies on the other hand side does the script seem optimum for achieving in-
ternational legal sovereignty for Kosovo.  
However, the fact is that not all EU countries have recognised Kosovo, in spite 
of their best efforts to accommodate Western interest into the script of sov-
ereignty. This has forced the Kosovars to pursue the EU standards and the EU 
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integration even more aggressively, which they still are, here in 2011. The 
Kosovars  
would be happy to lose some [domestic] sovereignty if that meant 
they were treated equally [in there negotiations with the EU]. Of 
cause they are in this, let’s say, uphill way of sovereignty they are 
still consolidating. They are quite demanding; there are a lot of 
demands to EU presence. They would like to see stronger 
presences in terms of the EU presents and voice. (EU Diplomat, 
2011:12)  
Not only in order to improve the institutions in the country, but to show the 
five non-recognisers that Kosovo is indeed a unique case and a country wor-
thy of recognition. The EU standards become a mean to reach the goal of fully 
recognition of the EU-countries and other non-recognising countries around 
the world. This is supported by the Foreign Ministry’s EU Department:  
We believe in the next teen years that we will be, if not in EU, at 
least on the door [steps] of EU, which means that if you are on the 
door [steps] of EU, it means that you have been recognised. … And 
if you are on the door [steps] of EU, it means that you have imple-
mented the EU standards in the domestic affairs, and you have 
reached some economic development, some economic standards 
and some law enforcement standards. (Gashi, 2011:13)  
There is no doubt about that Kosovo would like to see closer ties with the EU 
and the sovereignty scripts had the clear perspective that EU standards 
should lead to EU integration and recognition. Since independence have the 
EU institutions, in form of EUSR and EULEX, been helping Kosovo’s progress 
and some things have developed, but the progress is still slow (EULEX, 2011 
& Mjeku, 2011) and have yet resulted in further European recognition. This 
frustrates the Kosovars to a degree where they would like to sacrifices even 
more domestic control and authority in order to get recognised. 
Kosovo’s attempt to live up the standards of the EU and continually develop 
in order to obtain more international legal sovereignty have not resulted in 
recognition from any of the non-recognisers within the EU. Whether the con-
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tinuously recognition from other countries are a result of these efforts can 
this study only conjecture about. 
How quick these developments are progressing and who deserves the credit 
for this requires a closer look into the cooperation between the EU institu-
tions (EULEX and EUSR), created by the independence, and the Kosovars.  
According to the last two Progress Reports from the EU Commission is the 
progress not going as well as hoped. These reports are pointing out problems 
with lack of implementation of legislation (EU, 2010 & EU, 2011b). Only  
limited progress has been achieved on strengthening oversight of 
the government by the assembly, on improving scrutiny of pro-
posed legislation in line with European integration priorities or on 
the government and assembly working together on a shared re-
form programs. There are concerns as regards adherence of the 
assembly to its rules of procedure. (EU, 2011b:7-8) 
There is also an overall concern with the capacity building, where there is 
partly missing support for the EU agenda. (EU Diplomat, 2011, EU Official, 
2011 & EU, 2011b)  
The Kosovars, however, are seeing the Progress Reports in a different way:  
... we take it as homework, meaning the main issues which will be 
raised, or every issue which are raised in the progress report we 
try to address in coming here as working plum for the govern-
ment. (Gashi, 2011:3)  
According to earlier statements from the Kosovars should this criticism from 
the EU be limited as the Kosovars claim to be at the forefront with implemen-
tation of the EU standards, as part of their road towards EU Integration: “... it 
(the roadmap) should come from the EU institution, but we preferred from 
our side to started it before and we started implementing criteria that we 
should achieve without being requested directly by them” (Gashi, 2011:18-9). 
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Following the lines of the Progress Reports, the EU Official does not hesitate 
to establish where there lack of progress is coming from:  
No doubt that they have read what we, in the EU, wants them to 
say, and then started to say it already. No doubt about that, and 
they probably have some kind of plan that they can show us. But 
what is really interesting, and I think this have been proven time 
after time, is that as soon as we take a closer look, then haven’t 
this or that committee, which should be meeting every week had a 
meeting in months. (EU Official, 2011:25)  
The EU Official is not the only one having complaints about the cooperation. 
The Kosovars have their own dissatisfaction with the EU engagement:  
Kosovo has been promised Europe in perspective. However, until 
now, we have seen that, how would I say … what has happened to 
the international offers from, from, especially from the EU has 
been quite empty … this should not be as empty as it was until 
now. We have had some very specific, unique case of relationship 
with the EU. But we cannot remain a black hole in the region by 
only getting that promise of Europe in perspective without some 
concrete steps. (Mjeku, 2011:23) 
These two problems; the slow and ineffective implementation of the EU 
standards, and the EU promising initiatives towards integration without pre-
senting any, are not necessarily connected.  
Both problems can, however, be explained in the light of the failure to obtain 
absolute international legal sovereignty. If not for the five non-recognisers in 
the EU, the promises would actually have been followed by clearer mandates 
of the EU representation in Kosovo. With this would have followed stronger 
institutions, which would have been able to use both the stick of executive 
powers and the carrot of finances and a roadmap towards EU integration. 
The slow implementation is caused by the same lack of international legal 
sovereignty, but on another level. That of the Security Council blocking the 
corrective powers’ and the rest of the executive powers’ transfers from UN-
MIK to bodies of EULEX and the EUSR. Without this transfer can the EU insti-
tutions not as effectively push Kosovo’s development forward.  
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More comprehensive executive powers do not necessarily equal a smoother 
implementation of legislation though. As the current, limited executive pow-
ers of the EULEX have done little (EU Official, 2011). But it is important to 
notice that the mandates of corrective and executive powers were accepted 
and adopted into the Kosovars declaration of independence and represents a 
ground pillar in the road towards recognition as an independent state. Be-
cause the Kosovars  
believe that this (the executive powers) is not an obstacle because 
we are a new country, we have new institution, and sometimes 
fragile institutions, and we want to have EU here to support us es-
pecially in this three fields [of EULEX], which are very important 
on our road towards EU integration. (Gashi, 2011:5-6)  
Neither the script nor the declaration was based on a partial independence, 
but towards absolute international legal sovereignty. And the fact that the EU 
as a whole does not recognise Kosovo “is a constant reminder to them that 
the EUSR don't see them as a state, because of the non-recognisers.” (EU Dip-
lomat, 2011:12) This is corresponding with the Kosovars opinion: “our rela-
tion with EU is still with some problems because of these five non-
recognition countries” (Gashi, 2011:3). Thereby have the situation changed 
for the worse since the sovereignty script was used to declare independence. 
As full recognition (among EU countries) not has been reached, can the pow-
er of the mandates not fully be used, leading towards impatience and dissat-
isfaction among the Kosovars who supposedly is to be led by the EU institu-
tions.  
The EU Official is concerned that the Kosovar government has the opportuni-
ty to play the international institutions out against each other, because they 
constantly have to balance on a knife's edge (EU Official, 2011). With a 
stronger mandate, the EU institutions would not have this problem, and 
would be able to use the executive powers to a greater extend: The “EU need 
to have on single voice, so one person who can actually provide guidance to 
EULEX, [and] use the assistance programs in order to exert a stronger politi-
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cal commissary” (EU Diplomat, 2011:11). So the circumstances which the 
script was based on have changed and the corrective and executive powers 
are not used in the amount that the mandates otherwise gave the interna-
tional actors in Kosovo. 
It is clear that the sovereignty script has not been able to fulfil the Kosovars’ 
wishes of absolute international legal sovereignty. This has created a situa-
tion where the Kosovars have been forced to continue further and further 
towards the West. At the same time have the five non-recognisers put the EU 
in a situation where its institutions have weak and confusing mandates. The-
se mandates hinder both effective usage of EULEX’s executive powers, and 
the EU’s ability to uphold promises made to the Kosovars. This situation in-
fluences the three last aspects of Kosovo’s sovereignty. 
Whether the limited implementations by the Kosovars are out of unwilling-
ness or a lack of capacities does it create a situation where the Kosovar gov-
ernment has the opportunity to act as strong leaders, because they with can 
put up comprehensive demands towards a seemingly paralysed EU. By this 
the Kosovar leaders can appear with greater authority and control. This gain 
in domestic sovereignty can, however, be short lived if lack of capacities, in-
dicated by the Progress Reports, stops the development of a functional bu-
reaucracy, police force and other civil services.  
Stronger EU institutions would be able to develop these thus giving Kosovo a 
change of developing capacities towards Westphalian sovereignty for a time 
when the international presence will be declining. The current situation on 
the ground has yet to straighten Kosovo’s Westphalian sovereignty, though, 
as weak mandates and problematic collaboration does not give the Kosovars 
any less absent of external impact of the international society. 
This, combined with the fact that Kosovo still cannot make other internation-
al negotiations other than the bilateral, just stresses the point of absent in-
terdependence sovereignty.  
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Sovereignty Trade-Offs 
At the time Kosovo declared independence had its government limited do-
mestic sovereignty, though the local assembly under UNMIK administration 
and historic parallel institutions. UNMIK and KFOR provided every other ad-
ministrative and security related function associated with international legal-
, interdependence- or Westphalian sovereignty. The claim of independence 
was presented as international recognised sovereignty with the promises of 
the Ahtisaari Plan for domestic development, which sacrificed every other 
aspect of sovereignty for the aim of absolute international legal sovereignty. 
As a minimum should recognition from all the Western- and EU countries be 
obtained. This failed, with consequences for all the aspects of Kosovo’s sover-
eignty. 
The lack of international legal sovereignty have meant that Kosovo have not 
been able to negotiate under the auspices of the UN or with the EU, as intend-
ed by the Ahtisaari Plan, but only bilateral. While this is an improvement 
compared to the UNMIK period, the lack of international legal sovereignty 
induced a lack of interdependence sovereignty. This particular case suggests 
more of a parallel development than a trade-off. 
The trade-off of Westphalian sovereignty is nevertheless huge. The Ahtisaari 
Plan was designed for absolute international legal sovereignty on behalf of 
Westphalian sovereignty. Dictating the content of Kosovo’s constitution was 
the clearest example, the progress reports almost dictating what Kosovo 
must do better next is another. Even the fact that the international institu-
tions are the once capacity building and running vital civil services is an indi-
cation of Kosovo’s massive external. As this part of the Ahtisaari Plan was a 
given part of the script have it not been affected by the fact that the script did 
not result in absolute international legal sovereignty and is thus more a 
trade-off Westphalian sovereignty that a trade on international legal. Not 
even the lack of absolute international legal sovereignty results in a better 
Westphalian sovereignty as the Kosovars are forced to stick to the script and 
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learn further towards the West and EU influence in order to attract more 
state’s recognition. 
This situation of massive external influence on Kosovo’s institutions gives the 
Kosovar government both less authority and control over these institutions, 
and a lack of Westphalian sovereignty leads to a loss of domestic sovereignty. 
Again do we see a parallel tendency. This is not the case with the lack of in-
ternational legal sovereignty, and the weak mandates this carries with them 
more manoeuvrability for the Kosovar government, so the regain some of the 
control over the domestic institutions, hence straightening the domestic sov-
ereignty.  
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Chapter 5 
Ownership of Sovereignty 
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The analysis in the former chapter presented how the sovereignty script had 
been influential for the achievement of Kosovo’s limited sovereignty. The 
analysis also showed how the different aspects of Kosovo’s sovereignty are 
gained and lost in trade-offs through the relation and collaboration between 
Kosovo and the international society. This collaboration is some semblance of 
a nation building process. A process normally associated with states trying to 
build a nation up around them. In the situation of Kosovo much of the state 
building is being done by institutions from the international society. This 
poses the question of whether the Kosovars have any ownership over the 
state and nation building processes. This and some other aspects which have 
been brought up during the analysis need to be further discussed as it is im-
portant to mention to give a more comprehensive answer of the research 
question.  
A consistency in these aspects are that they are in some way a matter of the 
autonomy of Kosovo and the ownership the Kosovars have in the develop-
ment of Kosovar society. The tendencies seen are that the Kosovars are very 
inferior to the international organisations, but also that this has caused other 
tendencies where the Kosovars are trying to take a more autonomous role 
towards the international presence. To define these matters of autonomy and 
ownership the texts of Chandler (2009), Chesterman (2009) and Luci (2011) 
will help forge an understanding of this paradox between international state 
building and the Kosovars ability to obtain ownership over the development 
process.   
The unusual position of limited recognition gives Kosovo some difficulties 
regarding what the state’s actual negotiation mandate is. This status limits 
the achievement Kosovo can gain in collaboration with the international in-
stitutions as negotiations must be conducted on a bilateral level with one 
country at the time.   
So our relation with EU is still with some problems because of the-
se five non-recognition countries, but bilateral with the members 
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of the EU or with the recognising country we have very close cor-
poration and we try to influence in the EU institutions through 
these recognising countries, through our partners in the EU, but 
[not] directly. (Gashi, 2011:3)  
That the international society cannot agree upon the status of Kosovo makes 
it impossible for the Kosovars to make legal binding international agree-
ments with e.g. the EU (EU Diplomat, 2011). The EU Diplomat makes this fact 
very clear;  
[I]t is a problem to have these non-recognisers, because there are 
some obstacles, even the prospect of signing an agreement with 
Kosovo for [the] Commission or the department for all Western 
Balkan that they sign this stabilisation agreement and then they 
can participate in come programs. (EU Diplomat, 2011:7)  
As a consequence to this, the definitions of the EU mandates for Kosovo be-
come difficult to interpret and work under (EU Official, 2011), and this cre-
ates difficulties in connection to Kosovar ownership: 
If international interveners are not clear about the goals of their 
intervention or the means of achieving them then it is little sur-
prise that strategic polity-making is becoming displaced by eva-
sions which assert that the dilemmas and contradictions of polity-
making in this area are something which we just have to learn to 
live with. (Chandler, 2009:14) 
Because the mandates are unclear and the international society, in particular 
the EU, cannot agree on Kosovo’s status the Kosovars does not know how to 
take ownership over the state building process done by the international so-
ciety and it effects the nation building process. This should not come as a 
surprise since it is hard to take ownership in something undefined. Instead 
the Kosovars are trying to prepare their own roadmap towards the EU, based 
on the progress reports (Gashi, 2011).  The Kosovars are trying to take own-
ership of the process by preparing their own roadmap towards EU integra-
tion, but the EU institutions sees this as an obstacle because they have proto-
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cols and mandates to follow (EU Official, 2011) instead of the following and 
guiding the Kosovars along. This states a problem because:  
The relationship between international and national actors is al-
ways going to undermine the possibility of meaningful ownership. 
The international presence exists precisely in order to transform 
the polity in question. (...) while international staff operates with 
actual or effective immunity from the local laws, there is an on-
going contradiction between how internationals behave and how 
nationals are told that they must act. (Chesterman 2009:33) 
As a consequence the Kosovars cannot know which expectations they must 
live up to, in order for the international society and the EU to see them as a 
more reliable partner. Kosovo can more or less try to obtain credibility as an 
actor in the state building process, but as long as the non-recognising coun-
tries in the EU does not recognising Kosovo, this credibility might not be ob-
tainable or transfer into a sovereignty gain for a long time to come.  
Whether Kosovo’s path towards a sovereign nation-state could have looked 
brighter is hard to conjecture about. Had the Kosovars, for example, the op-
portunity to follow a different path than the sovereignty script towards in-
ternational recognition and open up for the Western influence on their state 
building? And was it necessary to let their independence be defined so much 
by the Ahtisaari Plan? Nita Luci (2011) makes the collective rendering of his-
tory that the Kosovo-Albanians are accustomed to be ruled by others and that 
they tend to offer their hospitality to the more powerful alternative. (Luci, 
2011)  
Luci also address a concern that this process of following the Western inter-
ests are 
at first empowered by traditional hospitality, Kosovars welcomed 
one of the largest-ever international military and peace building 
missions. Soon thereafter, however, Kosovars began to assess the 
post-conflict and peace building processes as a situation in which 
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Kosova’s people felt like guests in their own homes. (Luci 
2011:176)  
The international institutions have been given a lot of power due to Resolu-
tion 1244, the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and to some extent by the 
EU mandate that followed.  It can be seen as the international institutions 
have a caution or untrusting attitude towards the Kosovar people, which also 
was shown in the text of Gheciu (2006), and by the EU Official. This have re-
sulted in the  
transfer of power to local actors is rightly approached with cau-
tion. Typically, however, ownership is invoked in a far less specific 
way to refer to entire populations. This raises a different problem, 
which is the assumption that larger groups in what are typically 
deeply divided societies can be regarded as a single “partner” in 
anything more than an aspirational sense. (Chesterman, 2009:33)  
The ownership of the Kosovo people as a whole is therefore very hard to de-
fine. The government is showing huge support of the EU presence, while the 
critique is massive from the protest movement Vetëvendosje! (EU Official, 
2011 & Luci, 2011)  
Luci (2011) is also mentioning that one of the Ahtisaari Plan’s cornerstones 
was the establishment of peace and nation building based on Kosovo’s cul-
tural heritage. But the cultural heritage has been displaced by the UN resolu-
tions and EU policies, which instead have focused on individual rights and 
ethnicity. (Luci, 2011) “The result has been the omission of cultural value 
from practices of everyday life and the varied creative forms though which 
history and culture are continuously rethought and remade.” (Luci, 
2011:186) In the Kosovars aim of achieving the standards of the Aquis Com-
munautaire of the EU, they, to some extent, have had to break with parts of 
their heritage, to be regarded as cooperating with the EU. Some of the herit-
age that has to be dealt with was necessary to combat the transborder crimes 
and the corruption within the country, before they could even achieve further 
collaboration with the EU. (EU Official, 2011)  
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Returning to the discussion of establishing a state of Kosovo with authority to 
negotiate with international partners: The conflict in the north still gives 
some problems regarding the state and nation building processes of Kosovo, 
but this is also related to the international engagement and 
on the lack of clarity of broad strategic polity aims in state build-
ing interventions: the problematic nature of understanding state 
building as a framework for local ownership, solving the cause of 
conflicts … and, secondly on the lack of clarity of polity goals on 
the ground: the conflation of reconstruction with development, 
the lack of the role of the foreign militaries, and the technical and 
administrative approach to political questions such as security 
sector reform. (Chandler, 2009:10)  
Putting this in the context of Kosovo is the problem illustrated by the EU Dip-
lomat who is seeing the progress and the assistance of the EU institutions as 
more about state building in regarding the help to build up capacities rather 
than substituting the locals (EU Diplomat, 2011). From the EU Diplomat’s 
point of view, the job of the EU institutions is capacity building, not securing 
the support from the Kosovars that is not their mandate. In perspective dose 
this, in some ways, gives the Kosovars autonomy, though the EU is still moni-
toring the development.  
The international focus on helping Kosovo build capacities is important for 
the development of Kosovo (Gashi, 2011), but little focus on the communities 
are taken in to consideration. 
The legacies of structural factors are becoming more apparent the 
more international institutions seek to extend their remits of op-
eration and to transform non-Western states. Where states al-
ready have a weak relationship to societies, which are less domi-
nated by market relations and state regulation, it is unlikely that 
external state building, with its institutional focus, will make much 
difference at a societal level. (Chandler 2009:11)   
This non-focus on the societal level can also be seen in Kosovo in regarding to 
the EU institutions. The analysis are clear, the mandates of EU are working on 
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the institutional level. This collaboration on the institutional level can help 
the Kosovars closer to build an actual state, but not building an actual nation. 
The EU institutions seem to have their focus on the institutional level and in 
this process the local norms and cultures are under-prioritised by the EU.  
Both the EU Official and the EU Diplomat are rather pessimistic about the 
capacity building of Kosovo’s institution, predicting that they will not func-
tion satisfying for a long time to come. (EU Official, 2011 & EU Diplomat, 
2011) This conflict with  
the guiding principle [which] must be an appropriate balance of 
short-term measures to assert the re-establishment of the rule of 
law, and long-term institution building that will last beyond the 
fickle interest of international actors. (Chesterman, 2009:36)  
It is therefore important that the international society take a more progres-
sive approach to the capacity building in Kosovo. Otherwise, the Kosovar 
state might crumble under the heavy weight of holding a nation not support-
ing the construction of the state’s institutions. “A shift of attention to social 
and cultural relations of power could, in turn, also make unequal economic, 
political and security arrangements more visible. Such remain our responsi-
bility.” (Luci, 2011:186) 
The level of the autonomy that the Kosovars have showed towards the inter-
national society is seen as an attempt to gain more ownership of the process-
es both in term of the State building but especially to try to affect the devel-
opment of a nation. There have been some indicators to that the strong pres-
ence of the international society in Kosovo in has a high impact on the Koso-
vars, and the way they are acting towards gaining more control and authori-
ty.  
The EU institutions are in some degree showing a lack of understanding for 
the situation which the Kosovars feel they are in so the strict state building 
process maybe means a lack of development on all fronts. So to achieved bet-
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ter conditions short term capacity building initiatives could be started, and 
the EU could start engaging itself in a nation building process concerned with 
the social and cultural areas of Kosovar society. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
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The Ahtisaari Plan has been essential for Kosovo’s process of independence 
and the attempt to be recognised as a sovereign state internationally. Thus 
Kosovo has gained limited international legal sovereignty on the behalf of 
some domestic sovereignty and by accepting absence of Westphalian sover-
eignty. The international presences in Kosovo are focussed on capacity build-
ing of the state’s institutions, but have problems with unclear mandates. Es-
pecially the EU institutions have difficulties because of the five non-
recognising countries. Navigating the mandates in Kosovo is difficult too be-
cause the Kosovar government insists to follow their sovereignty scrip with 
the Ahtisaari Plan strictly. This has meant a lack of ownership and a lack of 
domestic sovereignty for the Kosovars because the international institutions’ 
capacity building progress is decoupled from the Kosovar people. Thus is 
there a focus on the state building, only with small regards of the local her-
itance and of the process of building a regular nation-state.  
The mandate problems with the EU institutions have given the Kosovars an 
opportunity to demand more progress from the EU and act autonomously, 
seizing control and authority. Thus Kosovars are trying to regain some of the 
lost domestic sovereignty and ownership over the process of developing Ko-
sovo.  
 
Policy Recommendation 
Abandoning of the strict principles of Ahtisaari and give the Kosovars owner-
ship over the development. 
The international institutions are clearly a necessary presence in Kosovo as 
the state is still unable to defend the area and fully administrate the civil ser-
vices required from it. For Kosovo to reach further EU standards and for EU 
to secure stability in the country the presence must be kept. The analysis 
showed that the unclear mandate, given the five non-recognisers, is posing 
troubles for both EU personal and Kosovars on the ground. Defining clearer 
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mandates, which clearly determines how far the EU institutions can go and 
what the Kosovars can expect will be the first step in improving the current 
collaboration. 
The unclear mandates make it difficult for the EU to build institutions that 
can secure stability, especially because of the northern municipalities. At the 
same time the collaboration does not take Kosovar heritage and culture into 
consideration, giving no ownership in the collaboration.  
As Kosovo’s sovereignty script of an international recognised, independent 
and territorial state have stalled, regarding the five non-recognisers, have 
this plan come to an effective stop. A relapses (into a state of lesser interna-
tional legal sovereignty) is basically unthinkable at this time and it should be 
possible to ease up on how strictly Kosovo follows the Ahtisaari Plan. It will 
instead be necessary to concentrate the state building on building up domes-
tic sovereignty. To do this Pristina’s focus must remain on the parts of the 
country where domestic sovereignty have been obtained, and start building a 
nation-state which they have ownership over.  
As all the EU states should be able to accept this change from the Kosovars 
demanding recognition to the Kosovars demanding ownership over their 
(technically) non-independent nation-state, can this change result in clearer 
mandates to the EU institutions. For the EU equals continuous stability con-
tinuous presence. But if the EU too will ease up on the Ahtisaari Plan’s de-
mands on Western norms can the EU institutions put themselves in a posi-
tion where they can secure stability and provide local ownership, for a more 
efficient state building. 
By abandoning the script of international recognised sovereignty for nation 
building and a gain in domestic sovereignty will Kosovo not become a mem-
ber of the EU or the world society any time soon, but neither is they accom-
plishing this with the current situation. Instead, by building up domestic sov-
ereignty can they create a partly recognised nation-state in the EU’s back-
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yard, in an area of other nation-states on the verge of EU candidacy, and thus 
become a political nation-state the non-recognisers simply cannot continue 
to ignore. 
It is time for both the Kosovars and the EU institutions to take a step back, 
pause, and start building the capacities of the nation behind the state, instead 
of just building an international recognised state. Kosovo must give the EU 
the space and time needed to build up the country’s institutional capacities, 
and take an active part in implementing the compromises. Meanwhile EU 
must give the Kosovars room to make “mistakes” in the nation building pro-
cess, when they pursue national norms not considered in “good taste” or in 
line with the standard Western norms. 
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Appendixes 
Interview Transcriptions 
Note: Two of the transcriptions have been printed in a separate document, as 
the interviewees have asked for anonymity. These transcriptions will hence 
not be published. 
